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Employer Recapture of ERISA Contributions Made by 
Mistake: A Federal Common Law Remedy To Prevent 
Unjust Enrichment 
American workers largely depend on the private pension system 
for their retirement income. Nearly 900,000 pension and benefit plans 
comprise the nation's nongovernmental retirement security system, 
providing coverage to over seventy-six million employees.1 Collec-
tively these plans post assets in excess of $1. 7 trillion, 2 controlling 
twenty to twenty-five percent of the equity and forty percent of the 
outstanding corporate bonds in the United States. 3 Because of the 
market leverage they exert, commentators have described private pen-
sion funds as "the largest single pool of capital in the world. "4 The 
declining ability of the Social Security system to serve as an exclusive 
source of retirement security,5 coupled with the strain placed upon 
public programs by a disproportionately aging population, 6 amplify 
the continuing importance of private sector sponsorship of retirement 
benefits.7 
This vast scheme to care for retired employees depicts the arche-
typal tension between the benefits of public regulation and the reduc-
tion in private initiative such curatives frequently engender. In 
response to abuses within the private pension system, Congress en-
acted the sweeping Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
1. Pensions at Risk: Can the Department of Labor Effectively Audit Private Retirement 
Funds?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House Comm. on 
Govt. Operations, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter Pensions at Risk] (statement of 
Chairman Lantos). 
2. See Swoboda, Official Urges Hands-off Private Pension System, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1990, 
at AS, col. 3 (quoting David Ball, Asst. Secretary of Labor). Experts predict that this amount 
will nearly double by the tum of the century, reaching almost $3 trillion. See Pensions at Risk, 
supra note I, at 8 (testimony of Raymond Maria, Inspector General, U.S. Dept. Labor). To put 
this figure in perspective, the U.S. national debt is approximately $3.2 trillion. See Curry, Budget 
Pact's Secret - Biggest Deficit Ever, San Francisco Cheon., Nov. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 5. 
3. Rifkin, Pension Power, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1990, at D3, col. 4. 
4. Id. As Rifkin observes, "U.S. pension funds are a reservoir of wealth that has emerged as 
an economic force within the last 40 years • . . • Pension funds are now the largest source of 
investment income for the American capitalist system." Id. 
5. See S. REP. No. 294, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990); Employee Pension Protection Act of 
1989: Hearings on S. 685 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and 
Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Pension Protection Act of 1989] 
(comments of Chairman Metzenbaum). 
6. See S. REP. No. 294, supra note 5, at 3 (Americans living longer and retiring earlier). 
7. The Bush administration has reaffirmed the nation's reliance on the private pension sys-
tem. See Uchitelle, Company-Financed Pensions Are Failing to Fulfill Promise, N.Y. Times, May 
29, 1990, Al, col. 5, at D5, col. 5 (" 'Our goal is that private pensions should provide a significant 
share of retirement income, and for many more people.' ") (quoting Ann Combs, Deputy Asst. 
Secy. Labor for pension and welfare benefits). 
2000 
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(BRISA). 8 BRISA promulgated a reticulated structure of vesting, dis-
closure, reporting, and fiduciary requirements that apply to nearly all 
private pension plans. 9 In contrast to its array of regulatory require-
ments, however, the Act also features exemptions and inducements 
that encourage employers to establish private plans. BRISA is in fact 
a carefully designed compromise. Sensitive to the need for vitality in 
the private pension sector, Congress sought to minimize the disincen-
tives that unduly burdensome or costly regulation poses to pension 
plan formation and maintenance. BRISA thus exhibits a balancing 
act between the necessity of governmental oversight of pensions and 
the imperative of private sector initiative. 
Section 403, the "exclusive benefit rule," best illustrates this ten-
sion within ERISA.10 Determined to prevent abuse of pension funds 
by imposing a strict fiduciary standard, Congress also sought to avoid 
the negative incentives to pension plan formation fostered by inequita-
ble treatment of employers. Declaring in one breath that "the assets of 
a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held 
for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants,"11 Con-
gress immediately carved an exception for employer contributions 
made by mistake of fact or law. As tempered by the mistaken contri-
bution provision, section 403(c)(2)(A), the exclusive benefit rule "shall 
not prohibit" the refund of certain erroneously paid contributions.12 
The complexities of modem pension arrangements provide fertile 
ground for contribution mistakes. 13 Employers make clerical and 
8. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in 
scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31 and 42 U.S.C.) (1988) [hereinafter ERISA]. 
9. The narrow categories of exceptions to ERISA's purview are outlined in ERISA § 4, 29 
u.s.c. § 1003(b) (1988). 
10. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988). 
11. ERISA § 403(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(l) (1988) (emphasis added). 
12. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1988), states: 
In the case of a contribution, or a payment of withdrawal liability ... 
(i) made by an employer to a plan (other than a multiemployer plan) by a mistake of 
fact, paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribution to the employer within 
one year after the payment of the contribution, and 
(ii) made by an employer to a multiemployer plan by a mistake of fact or law . . . 
paragraph C (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribution or payment to the em-
ployer within 6 months after the plan administrator determines that the contribution was 
made by such a mistake. 
13. Although this Note primarily discusses cases dealing with errors made in contributions 
to the pension plan, mistakes may also occur in the payment of the withdrawal liability assessed 
when employers exit pension plans. See, e.g., Huber v. Casablanca Indus., 916 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 
1990). By its terms, § 403 applies to both kinds of mistake. The escalating frequency of em-
ployer termination, see infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text, may increase the refund de-
mands for mistaken withdrawal liability payments. 
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arithmetic errors, 14 misunderstand their contribution obligations, 15 in-
correctly assume an employee is covered under the terms of the pen-
sion plan, 16 contribute on behalf of ineligible employees, 11 make 
payments on behalf of the wrong employee, 18 and contribute pursuant 
to invalid agreements. 19 Interpretation of section 403, applicable to 
these types of errors, has divided the federal courts of appeals due to 
an ambiguity in its wording. Courts diverge over whether to construe 
section 403's "shall not prohibit" language as permissive, as suggestive 
of a statutory cause of action, as supportive of common law relief, or 
as totally superfluous. 
Three circuits - the First,20 Third,21 and Sixth22 - have ruled 
that employers have a federal common law remedy, based on an unjust 
14. See, e.g., Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (clerical mistake); Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, 536 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ga. 
1982) (accounting mistake compounded by computer error); Service Employees Intl. Union Lo-
cal 82 Labor Management Trust Fund v. Baucom Janitorial Serv., 504 F. Supp. 197 (D.D.C. 
1980) (accounting error). 
15. See, e.g., Philippines, Micronesia & Orient Navigation Co. v. NYSA-ILA Pension Trust 
Fund, 909 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1990) (unclear whether principal employer responsible for contribu-
tions for independent contractor's employees), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 515 (1990); Carter v. 
CMTA-Molders & Allied Health & Welfare Trust, 736 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1984) (successor 
employer followed predecessor's collective bargaining agreement); Central States, S.E. & S.W. 
Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Borden, 736 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (employer not noti-
fied by union oflower contribution requirement); Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F. 
Supp. 560 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (mistaken belief that plan was employer-funded}. 
16. See, e.g, Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1989) (em-
ployee's job classification outside coverage of collective bargaining agreement); Electricians 
Health, Welfare, & Pension Plans v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265 (M.D. La. 1984) (employee 
withdrawn from union not entitled to benefits); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund 
v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884 (D. Minn. 1979) (contributions on behalf of 
employee not covered by agreement), affd, 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
17. See, e.g., Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (sole shareholder not permitted to receive benefits}; South Cent. United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Unions v. C & G Markets, 836 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1988) (payments on behalf of 
probationary employees), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Chase v. Trustees of the W. Confer-
ence of Teamsters Pension Fund, 753 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1985) (owner-drivers of taxicabs not 
eligible); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Intl. Painters, 719 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1983) (sole 
proprietors not eligible), modified, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983); Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 
Union No. 152 v. Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. W. Va. 1990) (self-employed employer). 
18. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare, 618 F. Supp. 943 (D. Del. 
1985) (contributions to truck driver fund erroneously made on behalf of maintenance employ-
ees}, modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). 
19. See, e.g., Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension 
Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981) (expired agreement); Teamsters Local 639 Employers 
Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); R.V. Cloud Co. v. 
Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 566 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1983) 
(same); E.M. Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 517 F. Supp. 1122 
(D. Minn. 1981) (employees' participation in plan terminated by new collective bargaining 
agreement). 
20. Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989). 
21. Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1989). 
22. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 
F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). 
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enrichment theory, to recapture overpayments. The Eleventh23 and 
Fifth Circuits24 have ruled that federal common law does not provide 
relief to employers who err. Other circuits that permit employers to 
recover monies paid by mistake fail to articulate the precise basis of 
the cause of action.25 The Fourth Circuit recently created an unjust 
enrichment remedy in a factually similar setting, 26 and the language 
and precedent on which it relied27 arguably support a restitutionary 
remedy for employer contributions as well. 28 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit deems the debate over federal common 
law irrelevant, contending that BRISA evinces an intent to return er-
roneously paid contributions. The court construes a cause of action 
directly from the statutory phrase, "shall not prohibit the return of 
such contribution or payment."29 Because of its reliance on an im-
plied cause of action, the Ninth Circuit summarily dismisses as irrele-
vant the question whether a common law remedy might be 
appropriate. 30 
Often, courts have settled upon an interpretation of section 403 
without full investigation. Moreover, courts have decided the unjust 
enrichment question when the issue was not squarely presented or vig-
orously pursued by the parties, 31 yielding elliptical examination of the 
23. Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986). 
24. South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. C & G Mkts., 836 F.2d 221 
(5th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). 
25. See, e.g., Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (return permitted only when trustee abuses discretionary refund authority); Peckham 
v. Board of Trustees of Intl. Bhd. of Painters, 719 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1983) (same), modified, 
724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale 
Produce Supply Co., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (affirming employer offset under 
§ 1103(c)(2)(A)). 
26. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990), cerL 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990). 
27. See Provident Life, 906 F.2d at 993 (citing the Third Circuit's Plucinski decision and 
relying on the mistaken contribution section, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A), for analogous support). 
28. See, e.g., Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 152 v. Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172, 
1174 (N.D.W.V. 1990) (reading Provident Life as authorizing federal common law relief for mis-
taken payments). 
29. Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pen-
sion Trust Fund, 763 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). 
30. See British Motor Car Distrib. v. San Francisco Auto. Indus. Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 
371, 377 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to entertain discussion about federal common law of restitution 
"particularly where this court does allow employers to bring suit under ERISA for restitution of 
mistaken contributions"). 
31. See, e.g., Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 964-
65 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[R]efund rights were mentioned below only in passing. Nevertheless, since 
•.. the case law is in some disarray, we take this opportunity to offer a modicum of guidance on 
the subject.") (footnote omitted). The court closed by admitting that it "realize[d) that plaintiff 
did not plead a claim for restitution per se," but nonetheless remanded the case for proceedings 
consistent with the court's newly announced unjust enrichment views. 879 F.2d at 968 n.10. See 
also Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Although the question 
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policy implications of refund decisions.32 This Note investigates more 
fully the policies animating BRISA in order to ascribe an appropriate 
construction to the mistaken contribution section. 
Part I analyzes the Ninth Circuit's anomalous implied cause of ac-
tion theory. Searching the legislative history as well as ERISA's lan-
guage and structure, this Part finds lacking the requisite expression of 
congressional intent to support a statutorily implied remedy. As an 
alternative, Part II explores the appropriateness of common law relief. 
Part II defends the creation of common law relief by the federal courts 
as consistent with the direct and indirect evidence suggesting that 
Congress envisioned judicial supplementation of BRISA. BRISA gen-
erally seeks the protection of employees' interests. Part III identifies 
two subcomponents that comprise this goal: expansion of private pen-
sion coverage and protection of pension fund assets. Recognizing the 
potential tensions between these considerations, Part III argues that 
letting employers recoup overpayments optimizes achievement of both 
goals. Part IV contends that this remedy should be typed an unjust 
enrichment action. This Note embraces an equitable model for the 
recovery of mistaken payments, capturing both statutory and tradi-
tional equitable concerns. Each of the circuits which permit recovery, 
whether under the statute or common law, make equitable balancing 
the touchstone of their analysis. 33 Part IV canvasses a range of con-
siderations that bear on the refund decision and assesses their compar-
ative weight. 
I. EXPRESS WEAKNESSES OF THE IMPLIED REMEDY THEORY 
Before examining the merits of a common law remedy for mis-
taken contributions, it is first necessary to determine whether BRISA 
provides a statutory remedy. If it does afford recourse, then a com-
[was] not well presented [and] not seriously pursued • .• we hold that no federal common law right 
to recovery of the disputed contributions ••. exists.") (emphasis added). 
Nonetheless, lower courts in these circuits adhere to these pronouncements as controlling 
authority. See, e.g., Florida W. Coast Operating Engr. Local 925 Welfare Fund v. Sunbelt Sales 
& Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (both South Central and Dime Coal pre-
clude federal common law recovery of mistaken payment); Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, 
Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 568 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (citing Dime Coal). 
32. See, e.g., Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension 
Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 233-36 (6th Cir. 1986) (announcing common law remedy without explain-
ing relationship to ERISA policy objectives), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1986). 
33. See, e.g., Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1057 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(common law relief governed by "general equitable considerations"); Dumac Forestry Serv. v. 
International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 529, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 814 F.2d 
79 (2d Cir. 1987) ("whether the cause of action derives from federal common law or is implied by 
the statute," return of mistaken contributions guided by "general principles of equity"); Award 
Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund, 763 
F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff praying for statutory relief"will have to establish that 
the equities favor restitution in order to succeed on the merits"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 
(1986). 
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mon law remedy is not only unnecessary, but inappropriate. BRISA 
explicitly grants relief to a variety of actors in certain situations. For 
example, the civil enforcement provision permits actions by the Secre-
tary of Labor or by a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. 34 De-
spite the conspicuous absence of employers from the list of 
enumerated parties in section 403, at least one court, as well as some 
commentators, 35 maintain that a remedy may be implied directly from 
BRISA. In Award Service, Inc. v. Northern California Retail Clerks 
Unions, 36 the Ninth Circuit construed BRISA section 403(c)(2)(A)37 
as indicating a congressional intent to provide statutory relief for em-
ployers who mistakenly contribute to pension plans. 
This Part of the Note addresses the merits of the Ninth Circuit's 
distinctive implied cause of action. Section A delineates the appropri-
ate legal inquiry for implied rights of action, framing the controlling 
question as one of legislative intent. Section B finds the language of 
the statute itself devoid of any congressional purpose to imply a rem-
edy. Section C draws a similar conclusion by evaluating the structure 
of BRISA and comparing different sections of the statute. Finally, 
section D traces BRISA's subsequent legislative history, finding fur-
ther support from the amendment process that no remedy should be 
implied. Part I concludes that the refusal of most courts to permit a 
statutory remedy is supported by a proper reading of congressional 
intent in passing BRISA. 
A. The Operative Question: Legislative Intent 
By implying a remedy under section 403 of BRISA, the Ninth Cir-
cuit arguably overlooked the forest for the trees. Award Service, Inc. v. 
Northern California Retail Clerks Unions involved a delinquency ac-
tion against an employer by a multiemployer pension fund. The em-
ployer defended on the ground that it was entitled to a refund for prior 
contributions made in error.38 Interpreting section 403(c)(2)(A), the 
court concluded that although this section provided no express cause 
of action, an implied right of action was appropriate. 39 The court 
rested its decision on the four-pronged test of Cort v. Ash, 40 which 
34. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988). 
35. See Note, An Employer's Implied Cause of Action for Restitution Under Section 403 of 
ERISA, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 225 (1985) [hereinafter An Employer's Implied Cause of Action]; 
Note, Implying a Statutory Right for Employers for the Return of Mistaken Overcontributions to a 
Multiemployer-Employee Benefit Plan. 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 396 (1987) [hereinafter Imply-
ing a Statutory Right]. 
36. 763 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). 
37. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A), § 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(1988). For the text of § 403, see 
supra note 12. 
38. 763 F.2d at 1067. 
39. 763 F.2d at 1068. 
40. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort test asks: 
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governs the implication of statutory remedies. Although the Award 
Service court methodically addressed each of the Cort factors,41 the 
preeminent focus of its analysis should have been congressional intent. 
The four factors are not entitled to equal weight; Supreme Court cases 
subsequent to Cort uniformly treat the other issues as incidental to the 
determinative question of congressional intent. 42 
Courts imply statutory remedies to execute legislative intent; thus, 
the relevant determination is whether Congress affirmatively intended 
to confer such a cause of action in favor of employers. Award Service 
applied an inappropriate standard by asking the wrong question. 
Award Service relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion, Fentron In-
dustries v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 43 in analyzing the intent 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" -
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any 
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny 
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply 
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally rele-
gated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 
422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). 
41. Even assuming arguendo that each Cort factor merits equal consideration, the Award 
Service resolution of them fails to make a persuasive case for an implied statutory remedy. For 
instance, the court is not necessarily correct that the 1980 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend· 
ment Act (MPPAA), Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, amending§ 403(c)(2)(A) to expand the 
scope of permissible recovery for employers who contribute by mistake, was intended for the 
benefit of employers. See 763 F.2d at 1068. The MPP AA, like ERISA, was designed to protect 
the economic interests of pension plan participants. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Team-
sters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("1980 .•• amendments were 
designed specifically to provide pension benefits for long-time employees and their benefi-
ciaries ...• The legislative history of [§ 403] does not indicate that the expansion of circum-
stances under which excess contributions could be returned to employers was intended to create 
a right to such contributions."), ajfd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); 126 CoNo. 
REc. 20,176 (1980) (explanation of Sen. Williams) (MPPAA protects participants and benefi-
ciaries). 
Moreover, the Cort test asks whether the statute, not a specific provision, was passed for the 
benefit of a particular class. Even if§ 403 does operate in isolation to the benefit of employers, it 
does so only as an incident to the overall purposes of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) 
(congressional findings and declaration of policy for ERISA); see also Whitworth Bros. Storage 
Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 233 (6th Cir. 1986) 
("[T]he statute was passed to benefit employees, not employers, despite the specific provision of 
§ 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) .... That an employer might benefit from that subsection does not establish a 
federal right and to so hold would ignore the thrust of ERISA and its purpose."), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1007 (1986). More than mere benefit to the class must be granted by the statute, and 
courts typically demand a showing that "Congress intended to confer federal rights upon these 
beneficiaries." Whitworth, 794 F.2d at 229 (quoting Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 724 (6th 
Cir. 1984)). Such a showing is not tenable for employers under ERISA. See Central States, S.E. 
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 511 F. Supp. 38, 47 (D. 
Minn. 1980) (ERISA was "enacted for the especial benefit of participants" and "not for the 
especial benefit of employers"), ajfd., 642 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1981). 
42. See, e.g.. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984) ("focus must be 
on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in question"); Middlesex County Sewerage 
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) ("key to the [implied remedy] 
inquiry is the intent of the Legislature"); Northwest Airlines v. Transport. Workers Union, 451 
U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (touchstone is "whether Congress intended to create the private remedy"). 
43. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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issue. Fentron permitted an employer injured by a pension plan's fail-
ure to pay benefits to bring suit against the fund.44 The Fentron panel 
interpreted BRISA to provide an implied remedy by asking whether 
"Congress intentionally omitted employers" from section 502.45 The 
court concluded that Congress did not, and held that "the statute does 
not prohibit employers from suing to enforce its provisions."46 Draw-
ing heavily on the reasoning of Fentron, the Award Service court ruled 
that employers were not affirmatively barred from seeking a refund for 
mistaken payments; accordingly, it concluded that they possessed a 
statutory cause of action. 47 
Award Service's finding that section 403 did not forbid this cause of 
action ended its inquiry; the court erred by not attempting to deter-
mine whether such relief was actually intended. As the Second Circuit 
aptly objected in Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Security 
Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 48 the focus is "not on whether the 
legislative history reveals that Congress intended to prevent actions by 
employers or other parties, but instead on whether there is any indica-
tion that the legislature intended to grant subject matter jurisdiction 
over suits by employers, funds, or other parties not listed in 
§ l 132(e)(l)."49 
The Award Service court should have ascertained whether Con-
gress included an unjust enrichment remedy in BRISA itself. The re-
mainder of Part I more closely investigates the indicia of congressional 
intent slighted by the court in Award Service. Among the aids avail-
able in determining congressional intent are the language, structure, 
and legislative history of the statute. so Examining these circumstantial 
indicators of intent, this Part concludes that Congress did not intend 
to provide a remedy for employers in BRISA. 
44. 674 F.2d at 1303. 
45. 674 F.2d at 1305 (footnotes omitted). 
46. 674 F.2d at 1305 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
47. Award Service, 163 F.2d at 1068. 
48. 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983). 
49. 700 F.2d at 892; accord Tuvia Convalescent Center v. National Union of Hosp. & Health 
Care Employees, 717 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 463 U.S. 1233 (1983); see also Inter-
national Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local #1 v. Menard & Co. Masonry Bldg. 
Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 1457, 1460 (D.R.I. 1985): 
Fentron, however, appears to stand logic on its head. Given the natural constraints on the 
scope of federal jurisdiction ... the question is not whether the national legislature affirma-
tively intended to bar suits by employers, trust funds, and others not specifically identified in 
§ 1132(a)'s laundry list, but whether Congress affirmatively intended that unnamed others 
should be permitted access to a federal forum. 
50. See Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981). The 
Cort test cannot be invoked persuasively without an affirmative showing that one of these factors 
suggests affirmative congressional intent. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-
23 (2d ed. 1987). 
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B. Statutory Language 
The cardinal indicator of legislative intent is, of course, the lan-
guage chosen by the legislature to express itself.51 Nothing in the text 
of section 403 suggests a congressional desire to give employers a 
cause of action. Congressional election of merely permissive language, 
le., "shall not prohibit the return of such contribution or payment," 
implies no affirmative intention to create a remedy.s2 The legislative 
history's description of this provision speaks in equally unavailing 
terms.s3 Congress ordinarily does not employ such tepid language 
when granting a right of action.s4 
In instances where Congress did intend to create an explicit cause 
of action for employers, it found no difficulty expressing itself clearly. 
Section 4301, dealing with withdrawal liabilities, authorizes a "plan 
fiduciary, employer, plan participant, or beneficiary, who is adversely 
affected by the act or omission of any party under this subtitle" to seek 
relief. ss Comparison of the language of these two sections, both grant-
ing causes of action to specified parties, suggests that Congress har-
bored no intent to give employers a statutory remedy in section 403.56 
The use of permissive language, rather than more direct or forceful 
terminology, strongly argues against implying a remedy under section 
403. 
51. See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CoNsr. §§ 46.01-.07 (4th ed. 1984). 
52. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he 
language of§ 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) of ERISA is permissive, simply allowing pension funds to refund 
monies. Merely giving permission does not imply that Congress also wanted employers to be 
able to force the refund of contnoutions."); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 
549 F. Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Congress apparently chose not to use the word 'mny,' a 
word which might suggest, arguably, a direction to the trustees to take affirmative steps to deter-
mine and return mistaken contributions .•.. [T]he use of the phrase, 'are not prohibited' ex-
presses an intent to allow, but not require, the trustees to return contributions . • • ."), ajfd. 
without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 {3d Cir. 1983). 
53. As the House Conference Report explained, § 403 "allows an employer's contributions to 
be returned ..• in certain limited situations." H.R. CoNP. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083 (emphasis added). 
54. See Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 
949 (D. Del. 1985) (less than equivocal language suggests no intention to grant action), modified, 
850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 
307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same), affd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 {3d Cir. 1983). 
55. ERISA § 4301(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a){l) (1988) (emphasis added). 
56. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1984) (the "carefully 
integrated" provisions of ERISA "provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to au-
thorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly"); Whitworth Bros. Storage 
Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 228 (6th Cir. 1986) (in 
light of reference to "employer'' in§ 1451, "Congress' failure to specifically mention the term 
'employer' in § 502 can, therefore, be construed as meaning that Congress intended to exclude 
employers from the provisions of that section"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1986); Airco Indus. 
Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund of Philadelphia, 618 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D. 
Del. 1985) ("In other parts ofERISA, Congress has specifically included employers •.• in listing 
persons entitled to bring actions .... "), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Grand 
Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Assn., 808 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (em-
ployer "may not fit a Title IV handle on a Title I claim"). 
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C. Structural Obstacles 
ERISA's structure similarly fails to demonstrate the predicate of 
an intended statutory remedy. Section 403, granting the putative re-
fund right to employers, does not appear in the subtitle of BRISA 
authorizing causes of action, but rather among the :fiduciary duty pro-
visions. 57 Had Congress intended to give employers a cause of action, 
logically it would have placed it with the sections creating causes of 
action. Furthermore, permitting employers to sue requires a malleable 
interpretation not only of section 403, but also a relaxation of section 
502's civil enforcement provision.58 Section 502 explicitly lists the 
parties empowered to bring a civil action to enforce ERISA's provi-
sions, including section 403. Thus implying a cause of action under 
section 403 requires, sub silentio, expansion of section 502. Judicial 
manipulation of section 502 must be approached cautiously for a vari-
ety of reasons. 
The first reason not to expand section 502 derives from the maxim 
of statutory construction that the enumeration of some parties implic-
itly excludes any others. 59 Second, the listing at issue in section 502 
informs a number of other provisions of BRISA. BRISA frequently 
makes reference to "participants, beneficiaries, and :fiduciaries."60 Ex-
panding the strict boundaries of this listing for purposes of recovering 
mistaken contributions could have unanticipated repercussions 
throughout ERISA's superstructure. 61 
The jurisdictional aspects of section 502 offer a third reason not to 
tamper with it. Section 502(e)(l) confers exclusive jurisdiction on fed-
eral courts to hear cases brought under that subchapter. 62 In analo-
57. See Soft Drink lndep. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 
F. Supp. 743, 747 (N.D. ID. 1988) (implied remedy textually insupportable due to location in 
fiduciary duty section). Compare Title I.B, Part 4, captioned "Fiduciary Responsibility," 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 with Title I.B, Part 5, captioned "Administration and Enforcement," 29 
u.s.c. §§ 1131-45 (1988). 
58. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988). 
59. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See 2A SUTIIERLAND STAT. CoNST., supra note 51, 
at§§ 47.23-47.25 (designation of certain persons may raise inference that omissions are deliber-
ate exclusions). For ERISA cases applying this rule to bar suit by unenumerated parties, see, 
e.g., Giardano v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989); Pfefferle v. Solomon, 718 F. Supp. 
1413, 1419 (E.D. Wis. 1989); In re Estate of Sheppard, 658 F. Supp. 729, 734 (C.D. ID. 1987). 
60. See, e.g., ERISA § 502(b)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(b)(l)(B) (actions against Internal Rev-
enue Code qualified plans); ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (actions to compel administra-
tive disclosure); ERISA § 502(e)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (federal court jurisdiction); ERISA 
§ 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (recovery of attorney fees); ERISA § 502(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h) 
(service of process requirements); ERISA § 502(k), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(k) (suits against the Secre-
tary of Labor) (1988). 
61. See International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local #1 v. Menard & Co. 
Masonry Bldg. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 (D.R.I. 1985) (§ 1132 listing pivotal to 
other clauses of statute). 
62. ERISA § 502(e)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1988). Part I of this Note limits itself to 
examination of whether Congress reposited relief in the statute. The failure of§ 1132 to confer 
specific jurisdiction on federal courts to hear suits by employers does not totally foreclose the 
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gous situations, courts have refused to expand the scope of statutory 
remedies to parties beyond those enumerated in section 502. 63 Thus 
pension funds, 64 unions, 65 and health care providers66 have all been 
possibility of a federal cause of action for unjust enrichment. Although plaintiffs would be pre-
cluded from claiming jurisdiction under ERISA's specific statutory grant; two arguable bases of 
jurisdiction would still exist to decide whether a statutory or common law cause of action ex-
isted. 
The first, and cleanest, ground for jurisdiction is general federal question jurisdiction. The 
federal courts are, of course, empowered to hear "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). It seems sufficient for a finding 
of federal question jurisdiction to require, as the Fourth Circuit has, that the "issue presented, 
whether it be the creation of federal common law or the interpretation of a specific BRISA 
provision" be "of 'central concern' " to BRISA. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 
906 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990). An action for the return of 
mistakenly paid monies to a pension fund easily meets the "central concern" test. See Airco 
Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Federal question jurisdiction poses one interesting question, although beyond the scope of 
this Note's full consideration. Section 502(e) of BRISA, 29 U.S.C. l 132(e)(l) (1988), grants 
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising under it. Although federal common law 
definitively will support§ 1331 jurisdiction, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 
(1972), it is an open question whether ju.-isdiction over the common law claim would also be 
exclusive. 
An alternative basis of jurisdiction could conceivably be 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988), conferring 
jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims arising under an Act of Congress regulating 
interstate commerce. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 
1, 8 n.7 (1983) (suggesting that § 1337 jurisdiction might support BRISA claims) (dictum). 
BRISA declares as one of its many purposes the protection and facilitation of interstate com-
merce. See BRISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. §§ lOOl(a), lOOl(b), lOOl(c), lOOla(c), and lOOlb(c) (1988) 
(findings and declaration of policy). The legislative history also suggests that protection of com-
merce partially motivated ERISA's passage. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4849; H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4640, 4646-7. 
Premising jurisdiction on§ 1337, however, engenders one serious obstacle not found if§ 1331 is 
used instead. Although the test for when an action "arises under" is the same for both §§ 1331 
and 1337, technically § 1337 has not yet been held to support common law actions. See Crown 
Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund of Philadelphia, 549 F. Supp. 307, 310 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 
1982), affd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 
1186 n. 12 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Hence common law actions might enjoy § 1331 but not § 1337 
jurisdiction. 
63. Independent of attempts to expand the array of parties capable of bringing suit by argu-
ing that they are implicitly included in ERISA's specific enumeration, some plaintiffs have also 
tried to stretch beyond ordinary meaning the definitions of parties specified in the statute. De-
spite this creativity, courts have refused to consider employers, for purposes of ERISA, to be 
"beneficiaries," see, e.g., R.M. Bowler Contract Hauling Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas 
Pension Fund, 547 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D. Ill. 1982); or "employees," see, e.g., Modem Wood-
crafts, Inc. v. Hawley, 534 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Conn. 1982). 
64. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Northeast Dept. ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Team-
sters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 153 (6th Cir. 1985); Carpenters Dist. 
Council of Kansas City Pension Fund v. Bowlus School Supply, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1232, 1233-35 
(W.D. Mo. 1989). See generally Annotation, Right of Pension Plan, As Entity, to Bring Civil 
Enforcement Action Under§ 502 of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 67 A.L.R. 
FED. 947 (1984). 
65. See, e.g., New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. State of N.J. 747 F.2d 891, 893 (3d Cir. 1984); 
District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row Publishers, 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
66. See, e.g., Lifetime Medical Nursing Serv. v. New England Health Care Employees Wel-
fare Fund, 730 F. Supp. 1192, 1195 (D.R.I. 1990); Pritt v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 699 F. 
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denied the privilege to sue under ERISA. 67 The express jurisdictional 
grant in the statute represents Congress' judgment as to which parties' 
access to the federal courts effectuates ERISA's purposes.68 
As the Supreme Court has observed, ERISA is for better or worse, 
"a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' which Congress adopted 
after careful study of private retirement pension plans. "69 BRISA pro-
vides oversight and investigative authority to monitor compliance with 
its scheme.70 It features specifically enumerated civil remedies71 and 
criminal penalties72 for violations of its commands. Where Congress 
endows a statute with an elaborate enforcement structure, courts 
should not imply additional rights of action. 73 Declining to imply a 
private remedy under BRISA section 409,74 the Supreme Court in 
Supp. 81, 84 (S.D.W.V. 1988); Cameron Manor, Inc. v. United Mine Workers, 575 F. Supp. 
1243, 1245-46 (W.D. Pa. 1983). 
67. Parties that perform two different roles under BRISA, one of which would enable them 
to litigate and one that would not, are not thereby precluded from bringing suit. See, e.g., Great 
Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101 (6th Cir. 1983) (employer performing fiduciary role as 
administrator of plan permitted to litigate); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Human 
Relations Commn., 669 F.2d 124, 128 (3d Cir. 1982) (same). 
68. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborer's Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983); see 
also Giardano v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989) (cannot imply a cause of action for any 
non-enumerated parties); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 
1289 (5th Cir. 1988) (hewing "to a literal construction of § 1132(a)"); International Union of 
Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local #1 v. Menard & Co. Masonry Bldg. Contractors, 619 F. 
Supp. 1457, 1460 (D.R.I. 1985) ("Where Congress has carefully catalogued a select list of per-
sons eligible to sue in a federal forum under BRISA, it seems gratuitous - and wrong - for the 
courts to override that policy judgment by expanding the array."). 
69. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (quoting Nachman Corp. 
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). 
70. See BRISA §§ 504-07, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1134-37 (1988). 
71. See BRISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988). 
72. See BRISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1988). 
73. See Giardano v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., 838 
F.2d 1173, 1174 (11th Cir.) ("Congress' express inclusion of several specific remedies in [BRISA] 
represents an implicit exclusion of remedies not listed."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); 
Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 568 (S.D. Miss. 1987) ("[l]t would be 
inappropriate to imply a private right of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1103. BRISA contains de-
tailed limitations and requirements as to which party to the agreement may sue for what."); cf. 
Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93-94 (1981) (comprehensive 
title VII remedial scheme counsels against judicial creation of additional private relief). Accord-
ing to Judge Posner, this injunction against judicial expansion of statutory remedies derives from 
democratic theory: 
The whole question of "implied" rights of action is deeply vexed. It lies at the crux of a 
series of debates over statutory interpretation. Those judges who believe that most statutes 
are compromises between rival interest groups hesitate to create implied rights of action no 
matter how defective a statute's remedial scheme without them, for they believe that in all 
likelihood the absence of effective remedies was a part of a compromise that enabled the 
statute to be passed, and they rightly do not want to undo the compromise. Those who 
believe that a regulatory statute should be viewed not as the point of balance between con-
flicting interest groups but as a straightforward effort to eliminate abuses do not hesitate to 
enforce a statute by whatever means are expedient. 
Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir. 1987). 
74. BRISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988). 
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Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell adverted to the 
deference due congressional prerogative: 
The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in 
§ 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it 
simply forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent 
omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of 
ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial 
scheme .... 
We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with 
such evident care as the one in BRISA. 75 
The same conclusion follows with respect to restitutionary actions 
by employers. As the First Circuit reasoned in parting company with 
the Ninth Circuit on the implied cause of action theory, because "Con-
gress has carefully catalogued a selected list of persons eligible to sue 
under BRISA, there is no plausible rationale for us gratuitously to 
enlarge the roster."76 Although employers no doubt contribute to 
BRISA's overall success, Congress' considered judgment was that 
BRISA did not require that employers have a cause of action under 
the statute.77 The interdependence of the statute's remedies with its 
substantive provisions should not be disturbed. 7s 
D. Subsequent History 
Congress' handling of proposed amendments to BRISA also sug-
gests that it did not intend a right to sue for return of overpayments. 
The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 198079 amended 
Title I of BRISA by broadening the scope of the mistaken contribution 
section to include mistakes of both fact and law.80 Despite this relaxa-
75. 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985). 
76. Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 965 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
77. See Estate of Sheppard, 658 F. Supp. 729, 734 (C.D. ID. 1987) ("[A]lthough Congress 
certainly felt employers and administrators were important to the proper functioning ofERISA's 
regulatory scheme, it provided them no power under the act to institute a civil action."); cf. 
Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 275 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he question is not whether the statute's 
ostensible purposes would be served by adding a private right of action to the remedies expressly 
provided, but whether Congress consciously intended (without bothering to say) that there 
should be a private right of action •... "), cert. denied. 486 U.S. 1056 (1988). 
78. The conclusion that the comprehensive legislative scheme forecloses the implication of 
statutory remedies should not, however, be read to obviate the creation of common law relief. As 
Justice Brennan pointed out in his Russell concurrence, "ERISA was not so 'carefully integrated' 
and 'crafted' as to preclude further judicial delineation of appropriate [common law] rights and 
remedies; far from barring such a process, the statute explicitly directs that courts shall under-
take it." 473 U.S. at 157; see also infra notes 132-67 and accompanying text (arguing that Con-
gress intended judicial development of common law for ERISA). 
79. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1296 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 
(1988)). 
80. See Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 410(a) (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § l103(c)(2)(A) (1988)), 
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tion of existing refund procedure, no effort was made to grant employ-
ers a cause of action to enforce section 403. The 1980 amendments 
did, however, give employers a right of action against plans for claims 
involving mistaken payments of withdrawal liabilities,81 further weak-
ening the argument that Congress intended, but forgot, to include a 
cause of action for employers in section 403. 82 
The Ninth Circuit stands alone in its adherence to the implied 
remedy; all of the other circuits to address the theory have rejected 
it. 83 Strong textual, structural, and historical arguments rebut any 
suggestion of congressional intent to give employers a cause of action 
under section 403. As the balance of this Note makes clear, however, 
congressional silence as to a statutory cause of action leaves open the 
possibility of common law relief for employers. 
II. SUPPLEMENTING BRISA WITH FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
Despite the lack of express or implied statutory relief, employers 
making excess payments to pension funds are not necessarily without a 
remedy. Some lower federal courts recognize that since "the contract 
between the parties, the pension plan and incorporated provisions of 
the collective bargaining agreement, and the rights and remedies im-
plicit therein or necessary to the enforcement thereof"84 are governed 
by federal law, employers may make a claim for restitution, based on 
unjust enrichment, under federal common law. This Part maintains 
that BRISA's purpose and structure invite federal courts to augment 
the statutory framework by crafting such common law remedies where 
necessary to effectuate BRISA's objectives. An examination of 
BRISA's preemption of state law is taken up in section A. Section B 
chronicles congressional expectation that the federal courts would em-
bellish BRISA with a body of federal common law; section C critiques 
the reasoning of those courts that have failed to fashion common law 
accordingly. Section D outlines the uniquely federal interests served 
by the statute, arguing that a federal decision rule is needed to admin-
ister section 403 of BRISA. 
81. See Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 104(2) (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1) (1988)). 
82. See Grand Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Assn., 808 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (addition of title IV cause of action for employers proves none intended under title I); 
Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.5 (11th Cir. 1986) (failure to give employer cause 
of action under original ERISA, or under 1980 Amendments, proves deliberate congressional 
choice). 
83. See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting both statu-
tory and common law remedy); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. 
Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.) (disagreeing with Award Service, but finding com-
mon law relief), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). 
84. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 
F.2d 221, 233 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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A. Preemption of State Unjust Enrichment Actions 
Restitution actions premised on unjust enrichment are tradition-
ally creatures of state common law.85 Prior to ERISA's enactment, 
employers could recapture erroneous pension payments through an 
unjust enrichment action under state law. 86 Congress concluded 
BRISA, however, with a sweeping declaration that it had created an 
exclusively federal sphere of interest by displacing all state laws87 re-
85. See, e.g., Hancock-Hazlett Gen. Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So. 2d 1385 (Ala. 1986); 
Alaska Sales & Serv. v. Millet, 735 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1987); Blue Ridge Sewer Improvement 
Dist. v. Lowry & Assocs., Inc., 149 Ariz. 373, 718 P.2d 1026 (Ct. App. 1986); Frigillana v. 
Frigillana, 266 Ark. 296, 584 S.W.2d 30 (1979); Dinosaur Dev., Inc. v. White, 216 Cal. App. 3d 
1310, 265 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Ct. App. 1989); Mt. Sneffels Co. v. Estate of Scott, 789 P.2d 464 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1989); Connecticut Natl. Bank v. Chapman, 153 Conn. 393, 216 A.2d 814 (1966); 
Home Ins. Co. v. Honaker, 480 A.2d 652 (Del. 1984); Williams v. Department of Health & 
Rehabilitation Servs., 522 So. 2d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Fleming v. Citizens & S. Natl. 
Bank, 243 Ga. 144, 253 S.E.2d 76 (1979); Hong v. Kong, 5 Haw. App. 174, 683 P.2d 833 (Ct. 
App. 1984); Jones v. Whitley, 112 Idaho 886, 736 P.2d 1340 (Ct. App. 1987); Charles Hester 
Enters. v. Illinois Founders Ins. Co., 114 Ill. 2d 278, 499 N.E.2d 1319 (1986); Monroe Fin. Corp. 
v. DiSilvestro, 529 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Newman v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843 
(Iowa 1990); Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665 P.2d 743 (1983); Codell Constr. Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 566 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co., 289 
So. 2d 116 (La. 1974); City of Auburn v. Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22 (Me. 1974); First Natl. Bank 
of Md. v. Shpritz, 63 Md. App. 623, 493 A.2d 410 (Ct. Spec. App. 1985), cert. denied, 304 Md. 
297, 498 A.2d 1184 (1985); Barry v. Covich, 332 Mass. 338, 124 N.E.2d 921 (1985); Sch-
wanderer v. Huron-Clinton Metro. Auth., 329 Mich. 258, 45 N.W.2d 279 (1951); TCF Banking 
& Sav. v. Loft Homes, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); First Natl. Bank of Jackson 
v. Huff, 441 So. 2d 1317 (Miss. 1983); Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Jolley, 747 S.W.2d 
704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Rust v. Kelly, 228 Mont. 220, 741 P.2d 786 (1987); Wendell's, Inc. v. 
Malmkar, 225 Neb. 341, 405 N.W.2d 562 (1987); Nevada Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Benedetti, 103 
Nev. 360, 741 P.2d 802 (1987); Patey v. Peaslee, 101 N.H. 26, 131 A.2d 433 (1957) (per curiam); 
Farese v. McGarry, 237 N.J. Super. 385, 568 A.2d 89 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Albuquerque 
Natl. Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982); Miller v. 
Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337 (1916); Thompson-Arthur Paving Co. v. Lincoln Battle-
ground Assocs., 95 N.C. App. 270, 382 S.E.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1989); Johnson v. Estate of Kent, 
In re Estate of Zent, 459 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1990); Aviation Sales, Inc. v. Select Mobile Homes, 
48 Ohio App. 3d. 90, 548 N.E.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1988); McBride v. Bridges, 202 Okla. 508, 215 
P.2d 830 (1950); Ying v. Lee, 65 Or. App. 246, 671 P.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1983); D.A. Hill Co. v. 
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 524 Pa. 425, 573 A.2d 1005 (1990); Jonklaas v. Silverman, 117 R.I. 
691, 370 A.2d 1277 (1977); Harper v. McCoy, 276 S.C. 170, 276 S.E.2d 782 (1981); Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe v. Strain, 432 N.W.2d 259 (S.D. 1988); Roach v. Underwood, 192 Tenn. 378, 241 
S.W.2d 498 (1951); Bryan v. Citizens Natl. Bank in Abilene, 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1982); South-
ern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Norfolk & Dedham Fire Ins. 
Co. v. AETNA Casualty & Sur. Co., 132 Vt. 341, 318 A.2d 659 (1974); Belcher v. Kirkwood, 
238 Va. 430, 383 S.E.2d 729 (1989); Eaton v. Engelcke Mfg., 37 Wash. App. 677, 681 P.2d 1312 
(Ct. App. 1984); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Couch, 376 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1988); Hendricks 
v. MCI, Inc., 152 Wis.2d 363, 448 N.W.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1989); Pancratz Co. v. Kloefkorn-
Ballard Constr. Dev., Inc., 720 P.2d 906 (Wyo. 1986). 
86. See, e.g., Reuther v. Trustees of Trucking, 575 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1978) (claim arising 
before ERISA's enactment); McHugh v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 638 F. Supp. 1036, 1048 
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); Hardy v. National Kinney, 565 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1983) 
(same); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 
F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.) (same), ajfd., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
87. State laws will be used throughout this Note to mean either statutory or common law 
rules. As defined by BRISA, " 'state law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other 
state action having effect of law •..• " BRISA§ 514(C)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(l) (1988). For 
preemption cases treating common law causes of action under the 'state law' rubric of§ 514, see, 
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lating to pensions. The facial expanse of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion, contained in section 514, immodestly "supersede[s] any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan .... "88 Despite the Supreme Court's candid description 
of the preemption provision as "perhaps ... not a model of legislative 
drafting,"89 one unifying theme can be distilled from the Court's treat-
ment of it: state laws of general application are preempted when their 
application has reference to or connection with an BRISA plan. 90 
State unjust enrichment actions, in the context of mistaken contribu-
tions, exhibit the requisite connection to pension plans to be 
preempted. 
1. Preemptive Language 
In deciding whether BRISA preempts a state law cause of action, 
the Court determines whether Congress intended to supplant relevant 
state law. The Court looks to ERISA's explicit language as well as its 
structure and purpose.91 Examining first ERISA's statutory language, 
the sweep of section 514's "relate[s] to" formulation reaches broadly. 
The precise language chosen underscores the breadth of the provision; 
Congress rejected earlier versions of the preemption clau8e limited to 
the specific subject matters covered by BRISA. 92 Congr~s also re-
sisted suggested wording changes by the executive branch that would 
have made the preemption language much more specific and hence, 
narrow.93 Congress gave the 'State law' preempted by BRISA an in-
e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mclendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990) (wrongful discharge); Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (tort & contract); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 
U.S. 58 (1987) (same). 
88. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (emphasis added). 
89. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). 
90. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text. 
91. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Hol-
liday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983). 
92. Compare H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 514(a), 120 CoNG. REc. 4717, 4742 (1974) (lim-
iting preemption to areas expressly covered by bill) and S. 4, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 699(a), 120 
CoNG. REc. 4977, 5002 (1974) (preempting only those state laws dealing with subject matter of 
ERISA) with ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
For an explanation of the changes, see 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (account of Sen. Javits) 
("Both [original] House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law, but ... defined the 
perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill."). As the Court pointed 
out in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983), the earlier, specific preemption provision 
was "rejected ..• in favor of the present language" indicating that the "section's preemptive 
scope was as broad as its language." See also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 408 & n.3 
(1990) (affixing significance to the rejection of more narrow phraseology). 
93. See ADMlNISTRATION RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE CoNFEREES 
ON H.R. 2 TO PROVIDE FOR PENSION REFORM, Apr. 1974, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
5047, 5145 (Comm. Print 1976). The recommended changes that were ultimately rejected were 
urged initially because the administration expressed concern that "[t]he preemption provisions 
under the House bill are extremely vague, while the Senate bill is too broad .... " Id. at 5146. 
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elusive definition, further signifying preference for federal law.94 As 
the Court concluded early in its attempt to define BRISA's reach, 
Congress expressed its desire that the preemption language be liberally 
construed by its stated intention to "establish pension plan regulation 
as exclusively a federal concem."95 
Unquestionably, BRISA by its terms preempts state laws that di-
rectly involve and regulate employee pension funds.96 In Shaw v. 
Delta Airlines, 97 however, the Court refused to confine the ambit of 
BRISA's preemption "to state laws specifically designed to affect em-
ployee benefit plans. "98 The Court reasoned that even a state law of 
general application " 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the nor-
mal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such 
a plan."99 Although Shaw dealt only with statutory law, the Court's 
subsequent treatment of common law causes of action has remained 
faithful to this expansive interpretation of BRISA's language. 
For example, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 100 the Court 
held that state common law actions were preempted to the extent that 
they related to BRISA. The Court inquired whether the plaintiff's 
state law claim required a determination of issues of central concern to 
ERISA.101 Although state common law ordinarily governed tort and 
contract actions, the unanimous Court concluded that the claims "un-
doubtedly" were preempted as they were "based on alleged improper 
processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit 
plan .... "1°2 The Court viewed as salient the relation of the state law, 
as applied to the facts of a particular claim, to an BRISA-regulated 
transaction or relationship.103 
The Court's recent treatment of Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClen-
94. For the text of ERISA's definition of "state law," § 514(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(l) 
(1988), see supra note 87. 
95. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); see also Dept. of Labor 
Op. Letter No. 75-153 (Oct. 15, 1975) (ERISA's preemption of state law "essentially without 
precedent"). 
96. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) (Georgia 
garnishment statute specifically directed at employee benefit plans); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 
U.S. 85, 97-100 (1983) (New York law prohibiting employers from structuring employee benefit 
plans in a discriminatory manner). 
97. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
98. 463 U.S. at 98. 
99. 463 U.S. at 97 (footnote omitted). 
100. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). The same day that it decided Pilot Life, the Court also held that 
state common law tort and contract actions for denial of benefits were not only preempted, but 
also automatically removable to federal court. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 
(1987). 
101. The Pilot Life plaintiff, denied pension benefits, sued the plan on common law contract 
and tort theories. 481 U.S at 43-47. 
102. 481 U.S. at 48. 
103. See 481 U.S. at 47-48. 
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don 104 further illustrates its willingness to permit BRISA to override 
state law. In McClendon, the Court considered whether BRISA pre-
empted an employee's state common law claim for wrongful dis-
charge. Reversing the Texas Supreme Court, a unanimous Court had 
"no difficulty in concluding that ... a claim that the employer wrong-
fully terminated plaintiff primarily because of the employer's desire to 
avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension 
fund-'relate[s] to' an BRISA-covered plan within the meaning of 
§ 514(a) .... " 105 The cause of action referred to and was premised on 
the existence of a pension plan; BRISA therefore superseded it. "Be-
cause the court's inquiry must be directed to the plan, this judicially 
created cause of action 'relates to' an BRISA plan."106 
As these cases demonstrate, the Court employs a functional defini-
tion of 'relates to,' analyzing whether the state law as applied in a 
particular case makes BRISA, or an area of concern to BRISA, a sub-
stantive element of the claim.107 State common law actions adjudicat-
ing claims involving an BRISA plan, transaction, or relationship 
typically meet this test. 10s 
These principles point to the conclusion that BRISA's preemption 
provision comprehends state unjust enrichment actions for mistaken 
contributions, because they implicate issues of primary importance to 
the entire BRISA scheme. First, although ostensibly brought under a 
state's general common law, the gravamen of the employer's com-
plaint would necessarily make BRISA a substantive element of the 
104. lll s. Ct. 478 (1990). 
105. 111 S. Ct. at 483. 
106. 111 S. Ct. at 483. 
107. See Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 (1985): 
Although Authier's claim is predicated technically upon the Michigan common law cause of 
action for discharge •.. as applied in this case, the action relates to an BRISA plan .•.. [H]e 
was terminated for fulfilling his obligations under BRISA. BRISA created the public policy 
element of the common law action •..• [E]ven though the Michigan cause of action regu-
lates ostensibly employment relationships and not pension plans, preemption is not pre-
cluded in this specific application. 
757 F.2d at 800; see also Lee v. B.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d 755, 756 (5th Cir. 
1990) ("Pre-empted state law includes any cause of action that relates to an employee benefit 
plan, even if the action arises under a general state law that in and of itself has no impact on 
employee benefit plans."); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (same); Scott 
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1505 (9th Cir. 1985) (preemption turns on whether challenged 
conduct is "part of the administration of an employee benefit plan"). 
108. See, e.g., Straub v. Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262, 1263 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation regarding pension plan); Shifiler v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Socy., 838 F.2d 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1988) (common law claim for denial of death 
benefits relates to benefit plan, "no matter how [the action was] characterized"); Anderson v. 
John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1987) (contract); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 
F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987) (state law causes of action for benefit denial); Phillips v. Amoco 
Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (11th Cir. 1986) (fraudulent failure to disclose retirement benefit 
information), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987); Pane v. R.C.A. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 168, 172-73 
(D.N.J. 1987) (breach of contract and infliction of emotional distress claims); Justice v. Bankers 
Trust Co., 607 F. Supp. 527, 531 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (fraud and misrepresentation by fiduciary). 
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cause of action. 109 Second, any attempt by a participant, especially an 
employer, to reach pension monies strikes at the heart of what BRISA 
protects: the assets of the fund. 110 Third, the terms of the employee 
benefit plan create the rights and obligations at issue in the lawsuit. 
Determination of whether the employer should receive a refund neces-
sitates examination of the pension agreement. 111 Fourth, because 
common law remedies must be crafted in view of advancing statutory 
aims, unjust enrichment actions require ascertainment of ERISA's 
policy objectives, as well as assessment of how best to advance 
them. 112 Fifth, the decision whether to allow an employer to recover 
such funds will influence the relationship between the employer, em-
ployees, and administrator of the fund. Refused demands may gener-
ate resentment by employers; successful requests may lead employees 
to suspect employer motivations. Securing harmony among partici-
pants is at the core of ERISA. 113 Finally, the return of mistakenly 
paid funds implicates the trustee's fiduciary responsibilities, since re-
funding overpayments is the sole instance when trustees may transfer 
109. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir. 
1990) (unable to "see how a different result could ensue from a claim of unjust enrichment" in 
light of Pilot Life and Taylor), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. 
Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 235 (6th Cir. 1986) ("clear thnt 
federal, and not state, law applies" to refund of overpayments), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 
(1986); Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744, 
746 (9th Cir. 1985) (ERISA preempts any state claim for the restitution of contributions"). 
110. See Pension Fund-Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group, 731 F. Supp. 161, 170 (D.N.J. 
1990) ("If a plaintiff seeks recovery of pension fund monies, the claim "relates to" the benefit 
plan, no matter how the claim is characterized."); Simmons v. Prudential Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 
675, 679 (D. Colo. 1986) ("It is difficult to imagine a situation arising out of a claim under an 
employee benefit plan invoking a state law which would fall outside of this definition [of 'relates 
to']"). But cf. Lifetime Medical Nursing Serv. v. New England Health Care Employees Welfare 
Fund, 730 F. Supp. 1192, 1196 (D.R.I. 1990) (should "only apply the preemptive powers of 
ERISA when a designated party brings suit" because "[p]reemption depends on the civil enforce-
ment provision."). 
111. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 
F.2d 221, 233-35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). Because the restitution claim 
"inevitably requires interpretation of the documents executed by the parties and the provisions 
made therein for payment and refund of contributions," such a claim "relates to" an ERISA 
plan, and therefore "federal, and not state, law applies" to such a claim. 794 F.2d at 234. See 
also Kentucky Laborers Dist. Health Council v. Hope, 861 F.2d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(common law fraud and restitution claims require interpretation of plan agreement and are pre-
empted even when no interpretive dispute arises); cf. Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich, 871 F.2d 1290, 
1294 (5th Cir. 1989) (computation of damages requiring reference to ERISA plan); Phillips v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986) (fraud claim requiring interpretation of 
fiduciary duties), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987). 
112. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
111 s. Ct. 512 (1990). 
113. See Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., 793 
F.2d 1456, 1468-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (more willing to preempt state law "if it affects relations 
among the principal ERISA entities - the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the 
beneficiaries - than if it affects relations between one of these entities and an outside party .•. "), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); accord Pane v. RCA Corp, 667 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D.N.J.), 
ajfd., 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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fund assets to employers.114 Policing such transactions is clearly a 
matter of federal concem.11s 
2. Uniformity Demands Preemption 
The purpose underlying ERISA's preemption provision buttresses 
the conclusion that the provision reaches state unjust enrichment ac-
tions for overpayment. Congress wanted to eliminate the possibility 
that the law governing pension funds would differ from state to 
state.116 For instance, in the floor debate, Senator Jacob Javits, a 
member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and 
one of ERISA's chief sponsors, expressed concern about "[m]ultiple 
and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with 
some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not 
clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme."117 The fact that 
single pension plans often covered employees in several states made it 
even more imperative to standardize pension obligations.118 In addi-
tion, the practical effects of a patchwork scheme on the nation's pen-
sion system argued for uniformity; as the bill's legislative history 
makes clear, Congress wanted to "help administrators, fiduciaries and 
participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the ne-
cessity of reference to varying state laws."119 
Most immediately, disparities in state laws pose the danger of less-
114. Mistaken contributions are the lone exception to the rule requiring fund assets to be 
used for the exclusive benefit of employees. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
115. See BRISA§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(b) (1988) (declaration of policy to "establish[] stan-
dards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans"); see 
also Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 1185-88 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (refunds implicate fiduciary 
duties). 
116. The necessity of uniformity also lends support to the case for the creation of a body of 
federal common law under BRISA. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text. 
117. 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974). Compare the remarks of Senator Harrison Williams, 
Jr., the Chair of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the bill's other manager 
in the Senate: 
[T]he substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to 
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or incon-
sistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to 
apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality 
thereof, which have the force or effect of law. 
120 CoNG REc. 29,933 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of 
State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DUKE L. J. 383, 391 ("clear that Congress wished to protect 
plans subject to BRISA from the additional burden of varying and possibly conflicting applica-
tions of state law"). 
118. See BRISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(a) (1988) (congressional findings of need for mini-
mum national standards); see also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4871 ("Because of the interstate character of employee 
benefit plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uniform system of law .... "); 
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
4639, 4655. 
119. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4639, 4650; see also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4865. 
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ened employee benefits. The Supreme Court recently held in FMC 
Corp. v. Holliday 120 that BRISA preempted a state law forbidding em-
ployee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation rights on a 
claimant's tort recovery. The Court worried that requiring "plan 
providers to design their programs in an environment of differing State 
regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, 
producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased 
benefits."121 Either the costs of tailoring plans to the disparate laws of 
different states or the desire to eliminate classes of benefits subject to 
state requirements with which it was unwilling to comply might 
prompt the employer to reduce benefits.122 As an alternative to reduc-
ing benefits, employers might retard the rate of retirement plan forma-
tion.123 Employers could likewise attempt to recoup costs 
immediately by reducing wages.124 Such concerns have led the Court 
to conclude that a unitary, national system of pension regulation best 
coheres with ERISA's needs.12s 
When employers have multistate operations or employees, uni-
formity would be defeated by differing state common law approaches 
to unjust enrichment.126 Disuniformity would hold pension plans hos-
tage to precisely the types of conflicting regulatory authority and un-
certainty BRISA sought to avoid.127 Refund policy discrepancies 
would force variations in the administrative and accounting practices 
120. 111 s. Ct. 403 (1990). 
121. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. at 408; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 
(1987) ("A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit 
program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce 
benefits. • . • "). 
122. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 105 n.25 (1983). 
123. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11. 
124. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105 n.25. 
125. See, e.g., Holliday, 111 S. Ct. at 409 (application of state subrogation laws frustrates 
"administrators' continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide") (emphasis 
added); Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11 ("Pre-emption ensures that the administrative 
practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations.") (emphasis added); 
Alessi v. Raybestos·Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (Congress "meant to establish 
pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.") (emphasis added). 
As Representative John Dent, ERISA's House sponsor championed, "I wish to make note of 
what is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal author-
ity the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans." 120 CoNG. REc. 29,197 (1974). 
See also Dept. of Labor Op. Letter No. 76-90 (July 14, 1976) (available in LEXIS, Labor library, 
ERISA file) [hereinafter Dept. of Labor Op. Letter] (pervasive federal interest in pension 
regulation). 
126. See Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1979) ("in order to provide for 
uniform regulation of employee benefit plans . • • ERISA preempts any state law permitting 
refund of [improperly paid] contributions") (footnotes omitted); cf. Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 
765 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1985) (state common law applied to employees in sixteen different 
states defeats "[t]he policy favoring national uniformity"), ajfd., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Authier v. 
Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1985) (recourse available to discharged fiduciaries should 
not depend on fortuitous state law interpretation of ERISA), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 (1985). 
127. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (New York employee pension anti-
discrimination law preempted due to possible inconsistency with other states' law); Alessi v. 
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of multistate plans, leading to considerable ine:fficiencies.128 Pension 
plans and, ultimately, pensioners, would bear the burden of cost and 
delay in protracted preemption129 and choice of law130 litigation. Fi-
nally, substantial temptation for opportunistic forum shopping would 
arise as multistate employers sought to recover overpayments in the 
most favorable jurisdictions.131 The threat of inconsistent or conflict-
ing state rules regarding unjust enrichment suggests that state laws 
should be preempted. 
BRISA cannot rely on state law for supplementation; the breadth 
of its preemption provision forecloses that possibility. Congress fore-
saw this problem and gave federal courts the ability to augment 
BRISA where appropriate. A congressional authorization of the 
power to create federal common law complements BRISA's invalida-
tion of state laws. 
B. Delegated Lawmaking for ERISA 
Courts generally hesitate to supplement acts of Congress with 
common law, supposing that most legislative enactments warrant no 
further :fine-tuning.132 In a few limited instances, however, courts de-
velop legal rules in the common law tradition. Where Congress di-
rects the courts, either explicitly or implicitly, to build upon the rules 
provided by a statutory framework, courts may develop substantive 
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (New Jersey statute that forbid certain 
benefit calculations permitted under federal law preempted by BRISA). 
128. See Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 9: 
An employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a 
host of [administrative] obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calcu-
lating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit 
payments, and keeping appropriate records • • . • The most efficient way to meet these 
responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme • . . • Such a system is diffi-
cult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in 
differing States. A plan would be required to keep certain records in some States but not in 
others; .•. to process claims in a certain way in some States; ••. and to comply with certain 
fiduciary standards in some States but not in others. 
129. See 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (prediction of Sen. Javits) (anticipating "endless 
litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation ..•. "); Dept. 
of Labor Op. Letter, supra note 125 (broad preemption language averts "litigation that would 
result from piecemeal preemption"). 
130. Cf. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 712-13 (1966) (White, J., 
dissenting) (concern, in LMRA context, over "which of several competing state statutes is to be 
applied and whether such application is reasonable when tested by the federal labor policy"). 
131. Cf. Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 474 U.S. 1087 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari) (differing administrative exhaustion requirements raise the "troubling 
effect of encouraging forum shopping'' particularly where "the coverage of particular BRISA 
plans frequently extends to beneficiaries in more than one State - and, no doubt, in more than 
one judicial circuit"). 
132. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. RadclitrMaterials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no contribution 
right in Sherman Act cases); Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 
(1981) (no common law right of contribution in title VII cases); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 
647 (1963) (no cause of action for abuse of statutory subpoena power). 
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law consistent with the statute's goals.133 BRISA provides direct and 
indirect evidence that Congress envisioned such lawmaking power for 
the federal courts in the area of pensions. 
The clearest case for the evolution of federal common law arises 
where Congress explicitly calls upon the courts to fulfill this role.134 
The paradigmatic example of such wholesale assignment of the legisla-
tive role to the judiciary is the Labor Management Relations Act 
(LMRA).135 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 136 the 
Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional grant contained in the stat-
ute did more than confer upon the district courts the power to hear 
.cases arising under the Act. Rather, the legislation expressed an inten-
tion on the part of Congress that the federal courts develop substantive 
law to supplement the statutory framework. 137 Commentators regard 
this "wholesale" creation of substantive common law as the broadest 
statement of the courts' ability to create such rules.138 
BRISA's legislative history evinces a similar congressional desire 
to vest the courts with lawmaking authority. Numerous references to 
the LMRA model punctuated BRISA's passage through Congress. In 
the debate over BRISA, Senator Harrison Williams, Jr., one of BR-
ISA's sponsors, explicitly 'invoked the LMRA doctrine as the appro-
priate model for BRISA: "It is intended that such actions will be 
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fash-
ion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act."139 Senator Javits, BRISA's other principal sponsor, 
133. See generally 19 c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE· 
DURE § 4514 (1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER]. 
134. See E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.32 (1989); Merrill, The Common 
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 1, 40 (1985) (express delegation oflawmaking 
function to courts "consistent with internal norm of legitimacy"). 
135. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 
(1988)). 
136. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
137. See 353 U.S. at 456-57: 
[T]he substantive law to apply in suits under section 30l(a) is federal law, which the courts 
must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor Management Relations 
Act expressly furnishes some substantive law ..•. Other problems will lie in the penumbra 
of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved 
by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that 
policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. 
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. 
(citations omitted). 
138. See 19 c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, supra note 133, § 4514 (1984). Another 
area where Congress has requested the Courts to develop a body of federal law is the antitrust 
sphere. See, e.g., National Socy. of Professional Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) 
(Sherman Act calls for common law supplementation and interpretation). 
A similarly uninhibited license, although of different origin, derives from article Ill's creation 
of a federal admiralty jurisdiction. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1; Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (recognition of cause of action for wrongful death vindicates constitu-
tionally based principle of uniform, national law of admiralty). 
139. 120 CoNG. RE.c. 29,933 (1974). 
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echoed similar sentiments: "It is also intended that a body of Federal 
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues in-
volving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension 
plans."140 The committees authoring and recommending the bill's 
passage shared a similar understanding.141 
Many courts have considered these definitive references to the 
LMRA as a sufficient signal to develop federal common law.142 
Courts have developed, for instance, common law remedies for em-
ployers, 143 employees, 144 and pension funds, 145 where necessary to ef-
fectuate BRISA's purposes. 
Substantial indirect evidence supports this conclusion. BRISA fre-
quently uses common law terms in defining its commands. For exam-
ple, the use of the word "trust"146 and the phrase "mistake of fact or 
law"147 incorporate common law concepts into BRISA. As Professor 
Merrill points out, when "Congress has, in effect, federalized a body of 
common law principles, then it would seem that in all probability it 
intended that federal courts would continue to develop that body of 
law in the common law tradition."148 Congressional election of lan-
guage embodying common law precepts indicates "that the enacting 
body has delegated common law powers to federal courts."149 In light 
of the express and implied congressional authorization of lawmaking 
power, courts have full license to develop a federal common law of 
pensions under BRISA. 
140. 120 CoNG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (emphasis added). 
141. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5107 (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of 
Conference). 
142. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-56 (1987); Kwatcher v. Massa-
chusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989); Anderson v. John 
Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 877 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Congress intended that a body of federal 
substantive law be developed to fill in the gaps left by ERISA's express provisions"); Whitworth 
Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 234-35 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 
1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984) (ERISA contemplates common lawmaking identical to LMRA); 
Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980). 
143. Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Western Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund, 847 
F.2d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1988) (federal common law permits employer's claim for fraudulent as-
sessment of withdrawal liability), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1988). 
144. See, e.g., Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 237-39 (3d Cir. 1980) {federal com-
mon law permits employees to recover contractually obligated benefits), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1142 (1982). 
145. See, e.g., Northeast Depl ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union 
No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 157 {3d Cir. 1985) {federal common law permits suits by 
one fund against another). 
146. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (inclusion of 
trust concept supports "'federal common law of rights and obligations under BRISA-regulated 
plans'") (citation omitted). 
147. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
148. Merrill, supra note 134, at 44. 
149. Id. 
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C. Evading Common Lawmaking 
Despite clear congressional intention that a federal common law of 
pensions evolve, some courts, while grudgingly acknowledging the ob-
ligation to create common law, have nonetheless done so in a cramped 
and narrow fashion. 150 The hesitance to fashion common law mis-
reads Congress' intent and misapplies common law principles. These 
refusals misapprehend the distinction between implication of statutory 
remedies and judicial creation of common law ones. The determina-
tion that Congress has not directly reposited relief for employers in 
ERISA151 does not foreclose the possibility of relief altogether. 152 As 
the Third Circuit observed in Plucinski v. LA.M. National Pension 
Fund, 
[W]e do not believe that by enacting section 403 of ERISA, which siin-
ply permits funds to refund mistaken contributions, Congress intended 
to foreclose the courts from investing employers with a remedy. The 
existence of section 403 shows that Congress reached a consensus that 
pension funds should be allowed to return such contributions; but it does 
not demonstrate any consensus by Congress against judicial recognition 
of a common law action allowing employers to sue for equitable 
restitution.153 
Courts may nonetheless create common law relief for employers be-
cause the relevant inquiries for ascertaining the existence of statutory 
and common law remedies differ. 154 Proof of explicit legislative ap-
proval of a particular remedy is not demanded where Congress dele-
150. See, e.g., National Benefit Admin. v. Mississippi Methodist Hosp. & Rehabilitation 
Center, 748 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D. Miss. 1990) ("While Congress did intend that the courts 
develop federal common law to be applied in ERISA cases ••• Congress did not authorize the 
courts to develop or allow causes of action or remedies not expressly provided for in § 1132 •••• 
Either plaintiff's ERISA claim arises under the express provisions of the Act, or it does not 
exist.") (citations omitted); Florida W. Coast Operating Engrs. Local 925 Welfare Fund v. Sun-
belt Sales & Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Morales v. Pan American Life 
Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D. La. 1989), ajfd., 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990). 
151. See supra Part I. 
152. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1969) (courts may 
fashion relief to effectuate vindication of statutory rights, even where statute silent as to remedy). 
153. 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1989). As one lower court commented, "in saying that 
BRISA 'does not prohibit' a refund .•. Congress implicitly left open the possibility that some 
other law might compel [one]. As we have concluded that Congress did not ••• create a [statu-
tory] right of action .•. this can only have been a common law equitable action." Soft Drink 
Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. Supp. 743, 751 
(N.D. lli. 1988); accord Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Houston Pipe Line 
Co., 713 F. Supp. 1527, 1534 (N.D. m. 1989) (lack of implied remedy does not close door on 
equitable common law relief); see also Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pen-
sion Fund, 618 F. Supp 943, 951 (D. Del. 1985) ("[T]he result of the Cort v. Ash analysis ••. was 
not that Congress intended to forbid this cause of action [unjust enrichment], but only that there 
is insufficient evidence that Congress intended to provide a remedy under § l 103(c)(2)(A)(ii)."), 
modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). 
154. Recent Supreme Court opinions treat the questions discretely. See, e.g., Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 4 (1981); Texas Indus. v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 633 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Transportation Workers 
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 79 (1981). 
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gates to the courts the responsibility of creating substantive common 
law. 155 Courts should not ask whether Congress specifically intended 
the proposed remedy, but instead should determine whether granting 
relief furthers the purposes of the statutory scheme.156 By confusing 
the two very separate analytic inquiries, those courts hesitating to cre-
ate common law have abridged the obligation imposed upon them by 
BRISA. 
A related deficiency in the reasoning of courts refusing to graft 
common law onto BRISA stems from the ascription of significance to 
its comprehensive regulatory structure. Some courts will not fashion 
common law remedies under BRISA, reasoning that courts should not 
upset the balances struck in federal statutes.157 For instance, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Amato v. Western Union lnternational158 displayed ex-
treme deference to the explicit statutory framework in deciding 
whether to permit an action for unjust enrichment brought by employ-
ees against an employer. While acknowledging that "[i]n appropriate 
circumstances, courts may develop a federal common law under 
BRISA,"159 the court nonetheless concluded that a common law rem-
edy was inappropriate: 
"[W]here Congress has established an extensive regulatory network and 
has expressly announced its intention to occupy the field, federal courts 
will not lightly create additional rights under the rubric of federal com-
mon law." Such is the case with the ERISA provisions before us here, 
which are "comprehensive and reticulated." ... [W]e find no need in the 
circumstances of this case to supplement these specific statutory sections 
with an ERISA common law of unjust enrichment. 160 
The internal logic of this reasoning is not pertinent in the context 
of the BRISA provisions involved here. Congress often legislates 
broadly, leaving the courts the task of filling in the interstices of a 
statute. As Professor Chemerinsky notes, "[t]his type of federal com-
mon law is easily justified. In adopting statutes, Congress cannot fore-
see every possibility. Inevitably, statutes have gaps and the 
application of statutes to specific situations requires the development 
of rules not created within the laws."161 BRISA was not intended to 
155. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1989). 
156. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973). 
157. See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986); Techmeier 
ex rel. Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390-91 (7th Cir.), cert 
denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986). 
158. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985). 
159. 773 F.2d at 1419. 
160. 773 F.2d at 1419 (citations omitted). 
161. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, § 6.3.1 (1989); see also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Were we bereft 
of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the recognized 
futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms of the Consti-
tution itself."); L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at§ 3-23 (recognizing "the development of judicial rules 
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address every issue that might arise, relying instead on courts to fash-
ion new rules as necessary.162 Furthermore, the mistaken contribution 
section does not contain a complex or interrelated web of remedies; 
indeed, the interpretation dispute centers on how best to interpret its 
lack of remedial mechanism.163 The legislative history is devoid of 
suggestion that the refund section is the product of any compromise or 
debate. 164 
Timidity in creating federal common law for BRISA also ignores 
the relationship between the broad preemptive effect of BRISA 165 and 
the need for federal decision rules. When a federal statute so perva-
sively governs an area of the law, federal common law must be relied 
upon to determine legal relations. 166 Because BRISA preempts state 
law in areas even where it substitutes no explicit rule of its own, 167 
federal common law must fill the resultant gaps in the statute lest a 
void be created. The reach of the preemption clause compels the de-
velopment of a common law of pensions. 
to cover gaps in the existing framework of federal constitutional and statutory law"); Mishkin, 
The Variousness of "Federal Law'~· Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and 
State Rules for Decision. 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957) ("effective constitutionalism re-
quires [ot] federal courts ... ~udicial legislation,' rules which may be necessary to fill in intersti-
tially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large by Congress"). 
162. Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984) 
("[C)ongress realized that the bare terms •.• would not be sufficient . • . . [and] empowered the 
courts to develop .•. a body of federal common law governing employee benefit plans. • • • First, 
it supplements the statutory scheme interstitially. Second and more generally, it serves to ramify 
and develop the standards that the statute sets out in only general terms.") (citations omitted); 
see also Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1079 (7th Cir. 1983): 
ERISA is a comprehensive statute intended by Congress to federalize the law relating to 
employee insurance and benefit plans . . . . As with many other like statutes, Congress 
obviously did not expressly address all the issues that might arise. Therefore, we ought, 
where unanticipated problems are presented, to develop substantive legal principles that 
accommodate the purposes of the statute. 
(citations omitted). 
163. See Award Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 774 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(no remedial ecology to refund provisions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); Soft Drink Indus. 
Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. Supp. 743, 750-51 (N.D. 
Ill. 1988) (ERISA not so comprehensive as to "actually determine[] an employer's right to resti-
tution"); see also Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(unjust enrichment action "will fill in the interstices of ERISA and further .•• [its] purposes"); 
Airco Ind. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 951 (D. Del. 
1985) (equitable unjust enrichment action necessary to fill in interstices of ERISA framework), 
modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). 
164. Cf Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818-19 (1980) ("[I]n light of the tempestuous 
legislative proceedings that produced [title VII) •.. the ultimate product reflects other • , . pur-
poses that some members of Congress sought to achieve. The present language was clearly the 
result of a compromise."). 
165. See supra notes 85-131 and accompanying text. 
166. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (legal relations must 
be determined by policy and content of federal law where area so dominated by sweep of federal 
statute). 
167. See White Farm Equip. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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D. Common Law Content: State or Federal? 
In support of the preemption of state laws, this Note has advanced 
a range of considerations implying a need for consistent national pen-
sion regulation.168 Those arguments also urge the establishment of a 
body of uniform federal rules. 169 The decision to formulate a uniform 
rule, rather than adopting state rules for federal purposes, must reflect 
the federal substantive need for uniformity.17° Rather than absorbing 
state law as the appropriate federal common law, 171 BRISA demands 
remedies appropriate to its role as the sole federal statement of pension 
policy. 
The LMRA model, from which BRISA derives,172 informs the de-
cision whether to use state or federal rules. The LMRA required pre-
dictability in the negotiation of interstate labor contracts; thus, 
uniform federal rules comprise its common law.173 BRISA also re-
quires predictability because the uncertainty attendant upon multiple 
and conflicting regimes of law would unduly complicate decisionmak-
ing and planning for pension plans.174 The need for uniformity has led 
many courts to discard state decision rules, adopting instead uniform 
federal pension standards.11s 
Thus Congress left to the courts the task of creating federal com-
168. See supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text. 
169. See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MlsHKJN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL CoURTS & TIIE FEDERAL SYSTEM 895-96 (3d ed. 1988) (interstitial common lawmak-
ing "shades into - and is of necessity often indistinguishable from - the pervasive question of 
the extent to which federal regulation displaces or preempts pre-existing state law"); WRIGHT, 
MILLER & CooPER, supra note 133, § 4514 (declaring that "many of the factors that are relevant 
to choosing between state law and an independent federal standard as a matter of federal com-
mon law also are relevant to deciding whether state law has been preempted by a federal 
statute"). 
170. The need for a uniform regime of law in an area has historically spurred the evolution of 
federal common law. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970) (admi-
ralty); International Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 691-92 (1963) (Rail-
way Labor Act). Compare Mishkin, supra note 161, at 813 (arguing that too often demands for 
uniform rules mask "implicitjudgment[s] about the relative value of federalism" rather than an 
identifiable substantive need for predictability). 
171. Federal common law may absorb state substantive law as the appropriate rule of deci-
sion, even though federal law technically applies. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 
(1966) (state substantive law absorbed where no identifiable federal interest present); DeSylva v. 
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (more convenient to adopt "ready-made body of state law to 
define the word 'children' " in federal statute); United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 
725 (1950) (congressional intent to incorporate state law). 
172. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text. 
173. See Allis·Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985) (''The interests of interpre-
tive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by refer-
ence to federal law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to 
uniform federal interpretation."); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-05 
(1962). 
174. See supra notes 116-31 (importance of uniformity in securing benefit levels). 
175. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident. Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir. 
1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); White Farm Equip. Co. v. White Motor Corp., 788 
F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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mon law. Entirely separate is the question of which common law rem-
edies are appropriate. Although many of the factors relevant to the 
need for common law guide the shaping of common law relief, the 
formulation of appropriate common law rules requires a full and 
searching inquiry into ERISA's purposes and aims. Part III identifies 
ERISA's various policy objectives and suggests a common law remedy 
that optimizes their advancement. 
III. FuRTHERING ERISA's AIMS BY PREVENTING UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
General principles of federal common law, as well as the explicit 
and implicit purposes of the statute, should inform common lawmak-
ing under ERISA.176 When fashioning common law remedies, courts 
should examine ERISA's broad purposes rather than focusing nar-
rowly on isolated provisions.177 In its broadest formulation, BRISA 
seeks to maximize retirement security for individuals. It advances that 
general goal by increasing the number of pension plans and the 
number of employees covered by those plans, and by guaranteeing a 
stable level of benefits to participants.178 This Part argues that 
ERISA's twin strategies of maximal employer participation and maxi-
mal protection of fund assets can best be secured by recognizing a 
federal common law action for unjust enrichment. 
A. Maximizing Pension Participation 
Undoubtedly, ERISA's raison d'etre was the protection of em-
ployee pension rights. But Congress also recognized that an absolute 
preference for protecting employees, at the expense of employers, was 
not feasible. In a system of voluntary pension plan participation, 
ERISA's drafters acknowledged that draconian pension regulations 
could discourage employers from participating. Ensuring that em-
ployers' costs do not exceed the anticipated benefits derived from offer-
ing retirement benefits best furthers the congressional goal of maximal 
participation. Contributions paid by mistake represent needless costs 
176. Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 281 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (en bane) ("When BRISA is silent on an issue, a federal court must fashion federal 
common law rules to govern BRISA suits. In making such rules, we must of course look to the 
statute itself for guidance .... ")(citations omitted), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 67 (1990); U.S. Steel 
Mining Co. v. District 17, United Mill Workers, 897 F.2d 149, 153, (4th Cir. 1990) (in crafting 
common law, court is "constrained to fashion only those remedies that are appropriate and nec-
essary to effectuate the purposes of BRISA"); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (common law must be consistent with BRISA's regulatory scheme). 
177. See U.S. Steel Mining Co., 897 F.2d at 153 (necessary to read specific sections ofERISA 
"in the broader context of the statute and not in isolation"). 
178. ERISA's stated "objective is to increase the number of individuals participating in em-
ployer-financed retirement plans [and] to make sure to the greatest extent possible that those who 
do participate in such plans actually receive benefits .... " S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4898. 
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that discourage the maintenance and growth of private pensions. Per-
mitting employers to recapture erroneous payments eliminates these 
disincentives to plan growth. 
1. Encouraging Employer Participation 
ERISA's legislative history records an unmistakable congressional 
intention to expand the scope and quality of private pension cover-
age.119 One Senate report justified BRISA by predicting that "[t]he 
enactment of progressive and effective pension legislation" would "re-
store credibility and faith in the private pension plans . . . and this 
should serve to encourage ... efforts by management and industry to 
expand pension plan coverage and to improve benefits for workers."180 
In addition, indirect evidence emerges from the debates surrounding 
enactment of particular regulatory standards. The burdens placed on 
employers by additional regulations received careful attention, as Con-
gress was "constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private 
retirement plans."181 Because employers need not sponsor pension 
plans, 182 ERISA's costs to employers required full consideration: 
[T]he cost of financing pen8ion plans is an important factor in determin-
ing whether any particular retirement plan will be adopted and in deter-
mining the benefit levels . . . . [U]nduly large increases in costs could 
impede the growth and improvement of the private retirement sys-
tem. . . . [T]he committee has sought to ... strike a balance between 
providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within reasonable 
limits.183 
179. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4682 ("One of the major objectives of the new legislation is to extend 
coverage under retirement plans more widely."); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4640 ("In broad outline, the bill is 
designed to • • • promote a renewed expansion of private retirement plans and increase the 
number of participants receiving retirement benefits."); 126 CoNG. REc. 20,176 (1980) (state-
ment of Sen. Williams) ("We passed BRISA in order to encourage the growth and maintenance 
of private pension plans."); 120 CoNG. REc. 29,198 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ullman) (all re-
quirements "carefully designed to provide adequate protection and, at the same time, provide a 
favorable setting for the growth and development of private pension plans"); 120 CoNG. REc. 
29,211 (1974) (comment of Rep. Rostenkowski) ("committee and conferees were necessarily cog-
nizant of the need to encourage the continued existence of these [private pension] plans"). 
180. s. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN 
NEWS 4838, 4849. 
181. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4639 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted 
in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890 (Although legislation "encourages provision 
for the retirement needs of many millions of individuals," it also "recognized that private retire-
ment plans are voluntary on the part of the employer."); 120 CoNG. REc. 29,211 (1974) (obser-
vation of Rep. Rostenkowski) ("necessary to remember that ... pension plans are voluntarily set 
up by employers as an inducement to attract employees"). 
182. See, e.g., BRISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988) ("this subchapter shall apply to any 
employee benefit plan if is established or maintained") (emphasis added). 
183. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4682; see also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4904; s. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
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The benefits of each additional requirement were carefully weighed 
against the disincentives to plan formation created by them, to ensure 
the enactment of only net beneficial reforms. As one committee report 
concluded, "[i]f employers respond to more comprehensive coverage 
... by decreasing benefits under existing plans or slowing the rate of 
formation of new plans, little if anything would be gained from the 
standpoint of securing broader use of employee pensions .... " 184 
The passage of the 1980 amendments to BRISA further demon-
strated the core objective of maximizing participation. Many of 
ERISA's original provisions retarded plan growth and encouraged 
employers to withdraw from pension plans.185 The remedial Multiem-
ployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPP AA)186 was designed to 
ameliorate these disincentives. 187 Furthermore, inducements to new 
plan creation were established.188 The 1980 changes also explicitly re-
1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4643; 120 CoNG. REC. 4278 (1974) (statement of 
Rep. Perkins) ("Each regulation has to be weighed against the burdens and pressures it imposes 
on the system. Each requirement has to be weighed against the cost increase which might re-
sult."). 
For example, the committee resisted proposals that gave employees complete vesting protec-
tion since "it is generally recognized that such a requirement for immediate and full vesting 
would not be feasible because it would involve such substantial additional coots for the financing 
of pension plans that it would tend to impede the adoption of new plans and the liberalization of 
existing ones." S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4904. 
184. s. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4890, 4904; see also 120 CoNG. REc. 29,198 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ullman): 
It is axiomatic •.. that pension plans cannot be expected to develop if costs are made overly 
burdensome, particularly for employers who generally foot most of the bill. This would be 
self-defeating and would be unfavorable rather than helpful to the employees for whose 
benefit this legislation is designed. For this reason, we have been extremely careful to keep 
the additional costs very moderate. 
This concern over sub-optimal regulation also resurfaced during the debates over the Mul-
tiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, (amend· 
ing ERISA). See, e.g., 126 CoNG. REc. 20,177 (1980) (observation of Sen. Williams) (necessity of 
phasing in new requirements); 126 CoNG. REc. 20,181 (1980) (concern of Sen. Dole) (overbur-
dening employers leads to termination). 
185. See H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., part I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2928 (then current rules encouraged withdrawals and penalized 
remaining employers); 126 CoNG. REc. 20,176 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (due to lack of 
penalties for and inequitable distribution of costs of withdrawal, "[t]he present system encour-
ages employers to abandon a weak plan at the first sign the industry is in trouble"). 
186. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980). 
187. See 126 CoNG. REc. 20,176-77 (1980) (statement by Sen. Williams) ("In order to carry 
out the policy of .•. encouraging the growth and maintenance of multiemployer plans," the bill 
makes changes in current law "to remove the incentives for employers to withdraw .••• "); 126 
CoNG. REc. 20,178 (1980) (statement of Sen. Javits) (''Two basic purposes of the bill are to 
protect participants and beneficiaries ..• and to eliminate problems that impede the maintenance 
and growth of such plans."); see also Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 3 (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 100la(c)(2) (1988)) (policy of act "to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the 
maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans); H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess., pt. I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2919, 2933 (discussing 
remedial rationale for MPPAA). 
188. For instance, the so-called "free look provision" encouraged employers to start new 
pension plans by providing them with a grace period, within which they incurred no withdrawal 
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affirmed ERISA's commitment to the expansion of the private pension 
system.189 
The MPP AA also amended the mistaken contribution section it-
self in one noteworthy respect. It broadened the mistake of fact provi-
sion to include mistakes of law for multiemployer pension funds, and 
eliminated harsh time limitations on refunds.190 The Joint Committee 
statement explained that the liberalization responded to concern that 
the prior refund rule was "too narrow,"191 suggesting that the changes 
deliberately made refunds more accessible.192 
Thus Congress had two goals: maximum retirement protection for 
pensioners and maximum opportunities fqr pension plan growth. 
Congress evidently understood that these aims were in tension to a 
certain extent. The legislative history of BRISA chronicles an effort to 
optimize the goals served by these regulations. The creation of a fed-
eral common law of pensions must proceed against the backdrop of 
this legislative purpose of increasing participation.193 
2. Paths to Employer-Sponsored Pension Plan Formation 
The legislative history provides little conclusive evidence whether 
Congress intended the mistaken contribution section to compel re-
funds.194 The language of section 403( c )(2)(A) on its face appears en-
tirely permissive, employing language such as "shall not prohibit."195 
The Department of Labor, which is charged with enforcing and inter-
liability for termination. See STAFF OF SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN REsOURCES, 
96rn CoNG., 2D SESS., S. 1076, THE MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT OF 
1980: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION 17 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter s. 
1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION]. 
189. See H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2933 ("The basic policy of the Act is that the retirement income security 
of multiemployer plan participants is best assured by fostering the growth and continuance of 
multiemp!oyer plans."). Similar changes were enacted in 1986. Among other things, they too 
restated ERISA's commitment to private pensions. See Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 238, 
§ 11002 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 100lb(c)(2) (1988)) (policy of Act "to encourage the 
maintenance and growth of single-employer defined benefit pension plans"). 
190. Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 410(a), 94 Stat. 1208, 1308 (1980). 
191. JolNT EXPLANATION OF S. 1076: MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENT 
ACT OF 1980, reproduced at 126 CoNG. REC. 20,189, 20,208 (1980). 
192. See, e.g., Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 
F.2d 744, 750 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (''The mistake of law provision was added [to] ... encourage 
more employer and employee pension plan participation," consistent "with MPP AA's intent to 
foster plan continuation and growth."); accord Dumac Forestry Serv. v. Inte,mational Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1987); Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks 
Unions, 763 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). 
193. Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 n.13 (5th Cir. 
1988); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (E.D. Penn. 1977), affd. 
without opinion, 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978). 
194. See, e.g., s. 1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 43 
("contributions must be returned, if at an within six months") (emphasis added). 
195. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1988). 
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preting BRISA, has declined several opportunities to clarify whether 
return of overpayments is mandatory.196 Some courts have viewed 
section 403(c)(2)(A) of the Act as entirely discretionary, subject to the 
views of the administrator of the plan;197 other courts have viewed the 
language as indicating a duty to return the funds when the equities 
favor it.198 
Those courts holding that the language of this section is merely 
permissive reason that it protects administrators from breaching their 
fiduciary duties should they elect to refund contributions to employ-
ers. Although those courts would permit a trustee to disgorge over-
paid funds as a matter of discretion, they would not compel the trustee 
to grant a refund. Treating the refund section as purely permissive, 
however, raises serious problems. Most notably, this approach pro-
vides no incentive for plan administrators to return overcontribu-
tions.199 Justifiable reasons, such as fear of legal liability, may inhibit 
administrators from responding to refund requests. 200 Less honorable 
trustee agendas, such as fraudulent assessment of contribution liabil-
ity, would also be protected under a purely discretionary system.201 
Finding that a federal common law remedy was required to effectuate 
congressional purpose, the First Circuit noted the impotence of a 
purely permissive refund system: "Since there would be no incentive 
to return mistaken payments voluntarily, the permissive refund mech-
anism ... would be like a permanently-shut window: decorative, but 
of no assistance in letting in a breath of fresh air. We will not lightly 
assume that Congress intended to enact a self-nullificatory refund 
provision. "202 
Not all courts have been persuaded by the intuitive appeal of this 
196. See, e.g., Dept. of Labor Op. Letter, No. 81-30A (Mar. 16, 1981) (available in LEXIS, 
Labor library, BRISA file). Responding to a direct inquiry whether mistaken payments must be 
returned to employers, the Department merely noted that ERISA's exclusive benefit rule "recog-
nizes an exception ..• in the case of certain employer contributions," and then proceeded to 
quote verbatim the language of§ l 103(c)(2)(A), without ever taking a position on whether such a 
refund was mandatory. Id. (emphasis added). 
197. See, e.g., Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 (11th Cir. 1986); Hardy v. Na-
tional Kinney, 571 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
198. See, e.g., Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 967 
(1st Cir. 1989). 
199. See Ethridge v. Masonry Contractors, 536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982); E.M. 
Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (D. 
Minn. 1981). 
200. Soft Drink Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. 
Supp 743, 750 (N.D. ID. 1988). 
201. See, e.g., Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Western Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension 
Fund, 847 F.2d 113, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1988) (trustees' fraudulent assessment of $589,239 in with-
drawal liability); see also Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 
1989) (worrying that, if employers lack judicial remedy, "a trustee could extort extra money 
from the employer by force or fraud"). 
202. Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
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argument. The Eleventh Circuit, in Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 203 noted 
in passing that because both employers and employees must be equally 
represented on the board of trustees of an employee benefit fund, 204 
arbitrary or capricious withholding of mistaken funds is deterred.205 
Such reliance on equal representation assumes confluent interests 
among all of the employers on the board, a dubious assumption. Even 
if their interests did coincide, equal representation can result in dead-
lock and inaction. 206 
The better reasoned approach is to view this section as requiring a 
refund only where equitable principles favor it.207 Failure to construe 
broadly the refund provision creates precisely the type of employer 
disincentives that Congress sought to avoid. 208 The First Circuit in 
Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund explained 
how a niggardly construction of the refund provision would deter 
participation: 
We are ... loathe to think that Congress meant either to craft a heads-1-
win, tails-you-lose matrix, or to institutionalize a one-sided windfall per-
mitting employee-participants to sponge off an employer's good-faith 
bevues. In the long run ... refusing to refund ... excess contributions 
could frustrate ERISA's goal of expanding pension plan coverage. Man-
ifest inequity is one effective way of discouraging employers from spon-
soring BRISA-qualified plans at all. 209 
Not only might a cramped reading of the refund provision drive em-
ployers to withdraw from pension plans, it might, for the same rea-
sons, slow the pace of their growth.210 
If courts read the mistaken contribution section too restrictively, 
employers may also reduce the level of benefits afforded to partici-
203. 796 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1986). 
204. See s. 1076: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 8. 
205. Dime Coal 196 F.2d at 399 n.6 (1986). 
206. Soft Drink Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. 
Supp 743, 750 (N.D. m. 1988). 
207. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. 
Supp. 943, 950-51 (D. Del. 1985), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988); Teamsters Local 639-
Bmployers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 867-68 (4th Cir. 1981). For a 
full discussion of the equitable considerations attending the return of such funds, see infra Part 
IV. 
208. See supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text. 
209. 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989); accord Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 
906 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Chase v. Trustees of the W. 
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744, 750 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985); Soft Drink 
Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. Supp. 743, 751 
(N.D. ill. 1988); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 
943, 950 (D. Del. 1985), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). 
210. See Plucinski v. l.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It 
must be remembered that it is optional for an employer to establish an BRISA qualifying pension 
plan. The BRISA statute ••. encourage[s] broad participation. If we put the burden of mistaken 
payments wholly on employers, we may discourage some employers from operating BRISA qual-
ifying plans.") (citation omitted). 
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pants. Although ERISA enacts stringent procedural requirements, 
private parties decide how generous the benefits of a particular plan 
will be.211 Employers who cannot recapture mistaken contributions 
could pass on the higher costs to pensioners.212 Little of ERISA's pur-
pose would be secured if employers responded to the increased protec-
tion afforded workers with correspondingly reduced benefit levels.213 
Concerns about the health of the private pension sector are partic-
ularly apposite today. Despite great strides made in extending pension 
participation, nearly half of the nation's full-time private wage and 
salary workers do not participate in an employer-sponsored plan.214 
Private pensions still control a massive stake in the retirement income 
equation,215 but current trends portend danger. Employers have cur-
tailed dramatically the rate of private plan formation.216 Not one mul-
tiemployer pension plan has been created in the United States since 
1980;217 thousands of plans were terminated during the past decade.218 
Although the disputed amounts may be quite large, they are often 
modest sums.219 The fact that these mistakes are small in relative 
terms, however, is not a basis for reassurance. The greatest gaps in 
private pension coverage exist in the small business sector and among 
part-time employees.220 Small companies, precisely the sector that the 
211. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) ("ERISA does not mandate that em-
ployers provide any particular benefits."); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 
511-13 (1981) (benefits determination left to private parties, not government). 
212. See An Employer's Implied Cause of Action, supra note 35, at 245 (costs passed on in 
form of lower benefits). 
213. Offsetting reductions in benefits as a result of rigorous regulation was another frequently 
voiced concern throughout the bill's legislative history. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
18-19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4890, 4904; H.R. REP. No. 807, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4682. 
214. Portability of Pension Plan Benefits and Investment of Pension Plan Assets: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Camm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 54 (1988) [hereinafter Portability of Pension Plan Benefits Hearings] (testimony of David 
Walker, Assistant Secretary of Labor). Since 1979, the percentage of workers covered by pension 
plans has actually fallen, from 55.7% in 1979 to approximately 49% today. Stern, Beware: Pen-
sions Are an Endangered Species, L.A. Times, July 30, 1990, at D5, col. 3. 
215. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. 
216. See Stern, supra note 214; Uchitelle, supra note 7. 
217. See Employee Pension Protection: Hearings on H.R. 1661 Before the Subcomm. on La-
bor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
14 (1989) [hereinafter Employee Pension Protection] (testimony of Rep. Erlenborn). 
218. See Pension Protection Act of 1989, supra note 5, at 1 (comment of Chairman 
Metzenbaum). 
219. Compare Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Houston Pipe Line Co., 
713 F. Supp. 1527, 1533 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ($3,539,889) with Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 
394, 395 (11th Cir. 1986) ($79,624.31) and Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 152 v. 
Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (N.D. W. Va. 1990) ($42,936.87). 
220. Portability of Pension Plan Benefits Hearings, supra note 214, at 54 (testimony of David 
Walker, Assistant Secretary of Labor); see also Labor Secretary Seeks to Require Workers to Save, 
N.Y. Times, May 17, 1990, at A20, col. 4 (Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole's call for "expan-
sion of pension coverage for employees of small businesses"). 
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private pension system depends upon for its future success, are least 
able to absorb the cost of mistaken contributions.221 
Deadweight losses to these smaller companies negatively impact 
the type, as well as the scope, of pension protection. Defined benefit 
plans are preferable to defined contribution plans, primarily due to the 
guarantee of stable retirement income they provide. 222 Yet employers 
increasingly elect defined-contribution, rather than defined-benefit, ar-
rangements. 223 Small businesses in particular appear unwilling to offer 
defined-benefit pensions.224 Experts cite the cost of administering de-
fined-benefit plans as the chief reason for this phenomenon.225 Forc-
ing employers to bear the full risk of mistaken payments will only 
further inflate these prohibitive costs. 
When deciding to create common law rules for BRISA, the federal 
courts must, as Congress did in enacting the statute, evaluate the prac-
tical effect of such rules on participation in employee benefit plans. 
Refusing to let employers recover mistakenly paid contributions cre-
ates disincentives for them to participate. Therefore, courts should al-
low employers to bring unjust enrichment actions against pension 
funds that withhold mistaken contributions, thereby furthering the 
statute's purpose of inducing employer participation. 
B. Safeguarding Pension Fund Assets 
The other clear congressional intention in passing BRISA was the 
protection of pension assets for the benefit of employees. This section 
contends that a rule hampering full and prompt refund of mistaken 
overcontributions thwarts this objective because it encourages employ-
ers to "set off" against due contributions the amount they believe they 
221. See Garland, Congress Has That Lean and Hungry Look, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 
160 (marginal benefits of pensions to employers increasingly outweighed by costs); Kladder & 
Durose, Considerations in Negotiating Alternatives to Participation in Multiemployer Pension 
Plans, 12 J. PENSION PLANNING & CoMPLIANCE 271, 284 (1986) (high costs dissuade pension 
plan formation by private employers); Stem, supra note 214, at DS, col. 3 ("many companies see 
the costs of running a pension plan as too high to justify them"); Uchitelle, supra note 7, at Al, 
col. 5 (pensions cost-prohibitive for small companies). 
222. See, Uchitelle, supra note 7, at DS, col. 1 (defined-contribution plans invariably provide 
lower retirement benefits). For other criticisms of defined-contribution plans, see Nathans, The 
New Breed of Pensions That May Leave Retirees Poorer. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 164. See 
generally E. ALLEN, JR., J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING 86-104 (5th ed. 
1984) (comparing and assessing various contribution and benefit arrangements). 
223. See Drew & Tackett, Record Number of Pension Plans Dropped in '89, Chi. Trib., Feb. 
9, 1990, at 1, col. 2 (net loss of 10,395 defined-benefit plans in 1989; steepest decline in history); 
Stem, supra note 214, at DS, col. 3 (37% increase in defined-benefit terminations, coupled with 
67% decrease in their creation); Employee Pension Protection, supra note 217, at 14 (testimony of 
former Rep. John N. Erlenbom) (voicing concern over movement out of defined-benefit plans). 
224. Pension Protection Act of 1989, supra note 5, at 64 (observation of Karen Ferguson, 
Exec. Dir. Pension Rights Center, that "smaller employers tend to go to defined contribution 
plans"). 
225. See Stem, supra note 214; Pension Protection Act of 1989, supra note 5, at 102 (testi-
mony of Chester S. Labedz, Jr., Compensation & Benefits Counsel for Textron, Inc.). 
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are entitled to by reason of past mistake. The better approach would 
be to allow a separate remedy for these employers, reducing their in-
centive to try to recoup overpayments by means of self-help. Mitigat-
ing the frequency of set-offs would protect the financial integrity of the 
plan. 
1. ERISA ~ Protection of Fund Assets 
BRISA seeks to guarantee retirement security for all working 
Americans by ensuring their right to retrieve, upon retirement, the 
pension benefits to which they are entitled. To that end, rigorous pro-
tection and regulation of pension plan assets is one of its corner-
stones. 226 This objective manifests itself in congressional insistence on 
timely contributions by employers. As the Supreme Court pointed out 
in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cen-
tral Transport, Inc., 221 "one of the principal congressional concerns 
motivating the passage of the Act [was] that plans should assure them-
selves of adequate funding by promptly collecting employer 
contributions. " 228 
The 1980 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
(MPP AA)229 further illustrates ERISA's reliance on prompt employer 
contributions for its success. 230 The MPP AA created for the first time 
a statutory obligation requiring full and prompt payment of contribu-
tion obligations.231 Provisions of the MPPAA concerning the pay-
226. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (1988) (policy of the Act is "to increase the likelihood 
that participants ••• will receive their full benefits"). See generally BRISA Subchapter I, "Pro-
tection ofEmployee Benefit Rights," 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1168 (West Supp. 1991) (comprehen-
sive vesting, disclosure, and reporting requirements). 
227. 472 U.S. 577 (1985). 
228. 472 U.S. at 580 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess. 9-10, 
reprinted in 1914 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4846 (''The pension plan which 
offers full protection to its employees is one which is funded with accumulated assets which at 
least are equal to the accrued liabilities, and with a contribution rate sufficient to maintain that 
status at all times.") (emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 
1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4652 (envisioning system in which "[a]ll current 
accruals of benefits based on current service ••• [would] be paid for immediately."). 
229. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-
1461 (West Supp. 1991)). 
230. See 126 CoNG. REc. 23,039 (1980) (declaration of Rep. Thompson) (intent ofMPPAA 
"is to promote the prompt payment of contributions and assist plans in recovering the costs 
incurred in connection with delinquencies"); see also Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. 
Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 547 (1988) (''The legislative history of 
[MPPAA] explains that Congress added these strict remedies to give employers a strong incen-
tive to honor their contractual obligations to contribute and to facilitate the collection of delin-
quent accounts."). 
231. See MPPAA § 306, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as BRISA§ 515, 
29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988)) ("Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiem-
ployer plan under the terms of the plan ..• shall • • • make such contributions in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement."); see also S. 1076: SUMMARY AND 
ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 44 (''The public policy of this legislation ••• 
mandates that provision be made to discourage delinquencies and simplify delinquency collec-
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ment of withdrawal liability also demonstrate ERISA's solicitude 
toward prompt receipt of payment obligations. Under the "pay now, 
dispute later" policy of the MPP AA, the withdrawing employer must 
make interim payments of withdrawal liability until the discrepancy is 
definitively resolved,232 permitting the fund to make immediate use of 
the payment.233 
2. Ensuring Prompt Contribution 
An undeniable relationship exists between the employers' access to 
an effective refund remedy and their timely payment of contributions. 
Employers who believe they have contributed more money to a pen-
sion fund than necessary often will withhold that amount when mak-
ing future payments. 234 Furthermore, the absence of an effective 
remedy may dampen the willingness of employers to contribute 
promptly in marginal cases. As one lower court observed, "if employ-
ers cannot recover mistaken contributions, they ... may withhold pay-
ments when they have any doubt that the payments are required, for 
fear that those payments could not be recovered."235 
Some courts permit employers to set-off mistaken payments;236 cu-
riously, a few courts further encourage employers to withhold pay-
ment by allowing set-offs yet refusing to entertain separate actions for 
return of overcontributions. In South Central United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Unions v. C & G Markets, the Fifth Circuit condoned 
just this type of contradictory result: 
[W]e hold that there is a right to offset mistakenly overpaid contribu-
tions against a delinquency owed. We wish to make absolutely clear that 
we are not establishing any affirmative right of action in favor of the 
tion. The bill imposes a federal statutory duty to contribute on employers •.•. ") (emphasis 
added). 
232. See ERISA § 4219 (c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2); ERISA § 4221, 29 U.S.C. § 1401(d) 
(1988). 
233. See Flying Tiger Line v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 830 F.2d 1241, 1244 (3d Cir. 
1987) (interim payment of withdrawal liability mandatory); Banner Indus. v. Central States, S.E. 
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 663 F. Supp. 1292, 1297-98 (N.D. lli. 1987) (preference to let 
pension retain money during dispute); Dom's Transp., Inc. v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 578 F. 
Supp. 1222, 1232 (D.D.C. 1984) (1980 changes evince "concern with the adverse effects of non-
payment of liability"), ajfd. without opinion, 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
234. Because of this perverse incentive structure, employers frequently assert entitlement to 
refunds as a counterclaim in delinquency proceedings, rather than in a separate suit. See, e.g., 
Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1988); Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 
152 v. Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.W.V. 1990); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension 
Fund v. Borden, 736 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. lli. 1990); Florida W. Coast Operating Engrs. Local 925 
Welfare Fund v. Sunbelt Sales & Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1990); see also Com-
ment, A Path of No Return: Employer Overpayments into Employee Benefit Plans, 8 INDUS. REL. 
L.J. 68, 82 (1986) (employers set-off mistaken payments). 
235. Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 
950 (D. Del. 1985), modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). 
236. See, e.g., Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply 
Co., 611 F.2d 694, 695 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
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employer under BRISA. We are simply applying BRISA to permit a 
refund of mistakenly overpaid contributions.237 
Aside from the logical and conceptual inconsistency of allowing 
set-offs but not permitting separate actions to recover precisely the 
same overpayments, set-offs are undesirable for a variety of other rea-
sons. First, set-offs place the responsibility for resolving the disputed 
claim on the pension fund, rather than the employer. It seems inequi-
table to place the burden on the pension fund when the employer's 
mistake created the dispute, particulary because the cost of identifying 
and prosecuting delinquencies can be substantial.238 As Representa-
tive Frank Thompson, Jr., one of the sponsors of the 1980 amend-
ments, commented, "[s]ome simple collection actions brought by plan 
trustees have been converted into lengthy, costly, and complex litiga-
tion concerning claims and defenses unrelated to the employer's prom-
ise and the plans' entitlement to the contributions."239 If the 
collection burden imposed on the fund exceeds the amount in question 
the administrator may ultimately decide not to pursue the delin-
quency. 240 Any collection costs or losses incurred by the fund are re-
ally losses in benefits to the individual pensioners; in this light, the 
costs of settling the dispute should be borne by the employer.241 
The second disadvantage to the use of set-offs surfaces when the 
employer ultimately is not due a return. In such cases the employer 
will have profited unjustly from the retention of the disputed amount. 
More immediately, the fund will be denied the ability to use the money 
productively during the pendency of the dispute.242 Employee benefits 
will be adversely affected, as the passage debate of the MPP AA 
recognizes: 
237. 836 F.2d 221, 225 (1988), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); see also Ethridge v. Ma· 
sonry Contractors, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 365, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (limiting employer's remedy to 
set-offs). 
238. The failure of employers to make timely contributions presently concerns many pension 
plans. See Cohen & Gaines, Industry Heavies Weigh in on Pension Shortfall List, Chi. Trib., May 
9, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (speculating that current underfunding trends could lead to a "crisis 
similar to the one that has engulfed the savings and loan industry"); Swoboda, A Spotlight on 
Pension Funding: Amount of Shortfall Put at $14 Billion, Wash. Post, May 8, 1990, at Cl, col. 2. 
239. 126 CoNG. REc. 23,039 (1980). Representative Thompson also pointed out that "addi-
tional administrative costs are incurred in detecting and collecting delinquencies. Attorneys fees 
and other legal costs arise in connection with collection efforts." Id. Dissatisfaction with these 
costs have led commentators to argue that the range of permissible employer defenses in collcc· 
tion actions should be severely restricted. See Comment, Employment Law ·Imposing Individual 
Liability to Simplify Collection and Discourage Delinquencies Under Section 1145 of the Multiem-
ployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 15 J. CoRP. L. 135, 155-57 (1989). 
240. See Comment, supra note 234, at 82-83. 
241. Cf. Dom's Transp., Inc. v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 578 F. Supp. 1222, 1239 
(D.D.C. 1984) (costs associated with employer withdrawals), ajfd. without opinion, 153 F.2d 166 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
242. See Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete, 484 
U.S. 539 (1988); Dom's Transp. v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 578 F. Supp. 1222 (D.D.C. 
1984), ajfd. without opinion, 153 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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Failure of employers to make promised contributions in a timely fashion 
imposes a variety of costs on plans. While contributions remain unpaid, 
the plan loses the benefit of investment income that could have been 
earned if the past due amounts had been received and invested on 
time .... 
These costs detract from the ability of plans to formulate or meet 
funding standards and adversely affect the financial health of plans. Par-
ticipants and beneficiaries ... bear the heavy cost of delinquencies in the 
form of lower benefits . . . . 243 
Unfunded liabilities caused by delinquent payments also pose the spec-
ter of perpetual noncollection due to insolvency.244 
The third objection to the use of set-offs derives from the unfair 
burdens placed on the other employers in a multiemployer pension 
plan. Those employers no longer participating in the plan lack the 
ability to recoup overpayments via the set-off mechanism, because 
only employers still participating have obligations against which to set 
off the overpayment. Whether an employer is still participating in the 
plan should bear no relationship to the equitable entitlement to a re-
turn of the mistaken contributions. At the same time, the burden of 
making up the shortfall due to the set-offs of the other employers falls 
squarely on those employers that are still participating.245 It would be 
better to rationalize the refund process within the BRISA structure 
than to let delinquent employers shift the costs onto those that 
promptly comply with their payment obligations. 
An amalgamation of prudential considerations comprises the 
fourth argument for forcing employers to litigate separately to recover 
overpayments. The complexity of collecting delinquencies would only 
be exacerbated if the separate issues concerning mistakes were also 
litigated concurrently.246 The use of set-offs might unduly complicate 
the mandatory award of interest247 and/or liquidated damages248 that 
243. s. 1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra note 188, at 43-44; see 
also Central States, S.B. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 580 
(1985) (delinquencies create "unfunded liabilities [that] jeopardize the participants' and benefi-
ciaries' interests"). 
244. See Central States, S.B. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 
U.S. 559, 580 (1985). 
245. See, Cohen & Gaines, supra note 238 (underfunding liability falls on pension insurance 
system and its premium payers); s. 1076: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CoNSIDERATION, supra 
note 188, at 44 (unfair to other employers); cf. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 
U.S. 364, 373 (1984) (allowing individual employers to negotiate more liberal arbitration proce-
dures disproportionately harms other contributing employers). Similar concerns over equity 
prompted the withdrawal liability provisions of the MPPAA. See Laborers Health & Welfare 
Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 545 (1988) (MPPAA "primar-
ily concerned about the burden placed upon the remaining contributors to a multiemployer fund 
when one or more of them withdraw"). 
246. For a description of the expense, delay, and complexity of delinquency proceedings, see 
supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text. 
247. BRISA§ 502(g)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(2)(B) (1988). 
248. BRISA § 502(g)(2)(C)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(2)(C)(ii) (1988). 
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are calculated by the amount of delinquency.249 The delays spawned 
· by such complications only heighten the manifest unfairness to the 
pension fund, which is without possession of the assets during the liti-
gation. 250 Finally, a separate action would permit a more searching 
focus on the full panoply of equitable considerations necessary to per-
mit a return of such contributions.251 
By refusing to allow separate recovery for overpayments, some 
courts unwittingly encourage employers to utilize sub rosa techniques 
such as set-offs. Although this Note contends that permitting employ-
ers to recover such mistaken contributions ultimately advances the 
purposes of BRISA, set-offs are an undesirable vehicle for effectuating 
these goals because of the unacceptable costs they pose to pension 
funds. The better reasoned approach prevents employers from setting 
off funds against legally due contributions. 252 If employers seek return 
of mistaken contributions, they should be forced to bring a separate 
unjust enrichment action at federal common law. 
C. The Exclusive Benefit Rule: Invitation to Unjust Enrichment? 
The issues surrounding refunds of overpayments inescapably inter-
sect with interpretation of section 403(c)(l),253 known as the exclusive 
benefit rule, which states that plan assets may not inure to the benefit 
of employers but rather must solely benefit participants. Because 
BRISA permits refunds as an exception to the exclusive benefit rule,254 
allowing discretionary refunds by plan administrators does not violate 
any express provision of BRISA. Construing section 403 to grant a 
judicially enforceable remedy, however, requires greater caution. 
Common law doctrine must conform to the express provisions of the 
legislation.255 Strict attention must be paid to whether a proposed 
remedy meshes with the aims of the exclusive benefit rule, and with 
the intended purposes of the statutory scheme as a whole.256 
249. See Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Philadelphia Fruit Exch., 603 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. 
Pa. 1985) (admitting possibility of separate refund proceedings but refusing to entertain unified 
suit because of imprecise derivation of total damages due to commingling effects). 
250. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. 
251. See infra Part IV. 
252. See, e.g., Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Given that the funds 
are entitled to the full contributions called for by the collective bargaining agreement, it follows 
that Lynch is not entitled to recoup sums already paid against this obligation."). 
253. BRISA § 403(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(l) (1988). 
254. See BRISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § l 103(c)(2)(A) (1988). For the text of this sec-
tion, see supra note 12. 
255. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (courts may not permit 
oral modification of pension plans where statute demands written agreements); Nachwalter v. 
Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986) (same). 
256. This section deals only with the question of whether the return of the amount in ques-
tion violates the fiduciary standards of BRISA. Quite separate are the issues surrounding the 
payment of interest on overcontributions. Even courts permitting refunds of the contribution 
amounts forbid the assessment of interest against the fund, because allowing interest would make 
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Some courts take the language of section 403 as evidence that Con-
gress did not envision the remedial approach offered by this Note. For 
example, the Second Circuit, in Amato v. Western Union International, 
Inc., 257 concluded that the purposes of the exclusive benefit rule ren-
dered a common law remedy inappropriate. "Given [its] interpreta-
tion ofERISA section 403(c)(l)'s anti-inurement provision," the court 
found no need "to supplement these specific statutory sections with an 
BRISA common law of unjust enrichment."258 
Such analysis is shortsighted. First, a restrictive interpretation of 
the exclusive benefit rule misreads its intended purpose. Congress 
passed ERISA's stringent regulatory requirements due to concern that 
employers might loot the assets of their employees' pension funds. 259 
The exclusive benefit rule serves as a prophylaxis to prevent such 
abuses.260 Because the remedy advanced by this Note will only be 
obtained through legal process, an unjust enrichment remedy in no 
way compromises this objective.261 Second, employees and the unions 
that represent them have a strong financial incentive to perform a 
watchdog function in scrutinizing the activities of employers.262 Em-
ployees and employers frequently take a long-term view of their rela-
tionships in structuring pension agreements, 263 yielding an element of 
self-deterrence on the part of employers and trustees. Ongoing rela-
the fund worse off than if the employer had never erred. This net loss to the fund flagrantly 
contravenes the exclusive benefit rule. See, e.g., Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 152 v. 
Bland, 745 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (N.D. W. Va. 1990); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & 
Welfare Pension Fund, 668 F. Supp. 893, 904-45 (D. Del. 1987) modified, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
257. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
258. 773 F.2d at 1419. 
259. See ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(a) (1988) (congressional finding "that owing to the 
lack of ... adequate safeguards concerning the operational soundness and stability of plans ... 
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered"); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 
U.S. 107, 112 (1989) (mismanagement of funds a primary concern of ERISA); S. REP. No. 383, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4892 (misuse of 
funds motivated ERISA's passage). 
260. See Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 960-61 
(1st Cir. 1989). 
261. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083 (although "plan assets generally are not to inure to the 
benefit of the employer," ERISA permits "an employer's contributions to be returned in cases of 
mistake"); see also An Employer's Implied Cause of Action, supra note 35, at 244-45 (§ 403 "in-
tended to prevent misconduct, insider abuse and corruption" but "not enacted to prevent the 
legitimate return of money mistakenly contributed") (footnote omitted); cf Deiches v. 
Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund, 572 F. Supp. 766, 773-74 (D.N.J. 1983) (Actions by bank-
ruptcy receivers to recover conveyances by insolvent employers to pension plans, although tech-
nically beyond § 403, are permitted. The absence of corruption risk means exclusive benefit rule 
is malleable.). 
262. Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Cantradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 
55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1119 n.58 (1988). 
263. Id. at 1132. For a game theory discussion of the positive behavioral incentives involved 
in long·term relations, see R . .AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CooPERATION 126-32 (1984) (in-
creasing frequency and durability of interactive relationship fosters mutual cooperation). 
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tions and mutual opportunities for reprisal characterize these settings. 
Employers, or trustees appointed by them, have a particularly strong 
self-interest in preserving employee morale; concern over the appear-
ance of corruption helps to restrain any potential impropriety by the 
employer.264 
Most fundamentally, a literalist interpretation of the exclusive ben-
efit rule fails to comprehend the relationship between employer partic-
ipation and the recapture of mistaken contributions. An inescapable 
nexus exists between the interests of employers and employees; if em-
ployers' interests are insufficiently protected, they may reduce the 
scope or quality of pension coverage for their employees.26s 
Legal rules resolving conflicts among participants, e.g., employers 
and employees, that assume the existence of a pension arrangement 
undervalue the interests of all parties by failing to consider the critical 
interdependence of participants' interests. Professors Fischel and 
Langbein make this point by classifying the operation of BRISA rules 
as either ex ante or ex post.266 Rules that do not solely benefit employ-
ees may seem inconsistent with the exclusive benefit rule, when viewed 
in the context of an extant pension fund; viewed, that is, ex post. The 
better conceptual approach appraises the benefits of new rules ex ante; 
that is, it constructs rules that "approximate the bargain the parties 
would have struck had they been able to anticipate and resolve" the 
conflict in advance.267 By assessing a rule ex ante, as Fischel and 
Langbein urge, any inconsistency "abates when we come to under-
stand that a contrary rule might lower the rate of plan formulation. 
Employees will not be well served by a legal rule that decreases the 
incentive to form plans in the first instance."26s 
Pension funds are not created by employers for the sole benefit of 
employees; as rational utility maximizers, employers establish pension 
funds for their own benefit. 269 Both employees and employers should 
be deemed ex ante beneficiaries of the pension trust.270 A rule that 
attempts to maximize the welfare of one at the expense of the other 
will make both worse off. 271 Congressional inclusion of the refund sec-
264. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1132 (employers averse to "a reputation for 
sharp practice that would harm morale"). 
265. See supra notes 179-225 and accompanying text. 
266. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1127. 
267. Id. at 1116; see also R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 82 (1986) (judicial 
resolution of unforeseen contingencies that approximates contractual arrangements to which par-
ties would have assented ex ante maximizes joint welfare). 
268. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1127. 
269. See Pension Protection Act of 1989, supra note 5, at 54 (testimony that pension plans are 
established to benefit employers as well as workers); E. ALLEN, JR., J. MELONE & J. ROSEN· 
BLOOM supra note 222, at 11, 26 (discussing employer motivations for pension creation). 
270. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1119, 1128. 
271. Id. at 1158. The effect resembles a Prisoner's Dilemma. In the classic Dilemma, two 
players are faced with a choice, either cooperate or defect. Each must make his or her decision 
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tion evinces awareness of this economic reality. Courts, too, should 
interpret the exclusive benefit rule realistically; construing the rule to 
allow refund of overpayments best captures the duality of interests 
that it serves. 272 
IV. EVALUATING EMPLOYERS' EQUITABLE ENTITLEMENT TO 
REFUNDS 
This Note has contended that allowing employers to recoup sums 
mistakenly paid to employee pension plans will advance the congres-
sional objectives embodied in BRISA. It has maintained that an ac-
tion for a refund, although not grounded specifically in the statute, is 
justified by the broad common law license given to the federal courts 
by BRISA. Part IV argues that these claims should be styled unjust 
enrichment actions under federal common law. 
The blanket refusal of some courts to permit the return of mistak-
enly paid monies ignores the beneficial effects refunds may have in 
certain situations.273 It would be equally unwise, however, to grant 
employers a refund in all instances. Courts should make case-by-case 
determinations whether to allow return of overpayments,274 relying on 
a variety of equitable factors borrowed from general restitutionary 
considerations. Section A discusses the particular applicability of eq-
uitable precepts in the context of an unjust enrichment action under 
without knowing the other's. The payoff for unilateral defection is higher than for unilateral 
cooperation. If both defect, both will be worse off than if both had cooperated. Thus, the Di-
lemma: each player's self-interest motivates him or her to try to take advantage of the other 
(defection); only if each is willing to accept the risk (and lower payoft) of cooperation do they 
maximize their aggregate utility. For a fascinating application of the Dilemma concept, see R. 
AxELROD, supra note 263 (repeated computer simulation of Dilemma proves cooperative strate-
gies most survivable). 
272. As Fischel and Langbein conclude, 
[w]e believe that ERISA permits the courts to be more forthright in recognizing the em-
ployer's interest as beneficiary. ERISA empowers the employer or other sponsor to create, 
amend, and terminate plans, to name the fiduciaries, and to recapture excess assets. These 
statutory powers evince that pension and benefit plans embody the interests of employers as 
well as employees. Moreover, it is a mistake to view a pension plan as a zero sum game, in 
which an action that benefits the employer automatically harms the employees. On the 
contrary, from the ex ante perspective, the interest of employer and employees converge. 
The correct interpretation •.. is the rule that maximizes the joint welfare of both. 
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 262, at 1158 (footnote omitted). 
273. See generally supra Part III (common law remedy increases participation and protects 
fund assets). 
274. If the court ultimately finds an unjust enrichment remedy unwarranted in a particular 
case, then that would be a disposition on the merits; jurisdiction still exists to determine whether 
a cause of action is colorable. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1945). Compare Airco Indus. 
Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1032 (3d Cir. 1988) (af-
firmingjurisdiction, but not reaching the ultimate question on the merits) with Dime Coal Co. v. 
Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 396 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding jurisdiction while refusing to permit federal 
common law remedy) and Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas 
Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1986) (answering both the jurisdiction and the 
merits questions affirmatively). See generally supra note 62 (discussing various jurisdictional 
theories). 
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BRISA. Section B tailors traditional equitable concepts to fit the situ-
ations typically arising in overpayment disputes. Although resolution 
of particular unjust enrichment claims will of necessity be highly fact-
specific, this Part provides guidance in weighing the strengths of com-
peting equitable claims certain to recur. 
A. Restitution Provides Recovery for Mistaken Payments 
The intuition that a person should not profit because of another's 
mistake finds expression in the equitable tradition of the common 
law.275 Indeed, an entire legal discipline, premised on notions of jus-
tice and fair play,276 has sprung from the precept that "[a] person who 
has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to 
make restitution to the other."277 According to Professor Palmer, the 
prototypical case of unjust enrichment arises where one party "has 
performed in the belief that he was obligated to do so, when in fact he 
either had no obligation or was not bound to the full extent of the 
performance rendered. "278 
Such mistaken performance may arise where one party makes a 
computational or clerical error,279 misconstrues the terms of the agree-
ment, 280 incorrectly assumes the existence of a condition precedent to 
performance,281 mistakenly pays money to a third party on behalf of 
another,282 or performs pursuant to an invalid agreement.283 These 
mistakes in performance typically present compelling cases for restitu-
tion of the money.284 
The traditional unjust enrichment model provides a useful depar-
ture point for analyzing the return of contributions under BRISA. 
Many overpayment scenarios involving BRISA plans285 resemble the 
275. See, e.g., Osborn v. Phelps, 19 Conn. 63, 76 (1848) (Ellsworth, J., dissenting) ("Errors 
are incident to human affairs; and there must somewhere rest a power to grant relief, or there is a 
great defect in the administration of justice."). 
276. See 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsnnmON § 1.1 (1978) (moral justification for 
restitution). 
277. See llEsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 1 (1937). 
278. G. PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUsr ENRICHMENT 21 (1962). 
279. See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.8; llEsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 20 ("Mis· 
take as to Extent of Duty or Amount Paid in Discharge Thereof") (1937); 13 S. WILLisroN, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACI'S § 1574 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1970). 
280. See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.8. 
281. See G. PALMER, supra note 278, at 27-28; llEsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 18 ("Mis-
taken Belief in Duty Under a Contract With Payee") (1937). 
282. See REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 22 ("Mistake as to Payee") (1937). 
283. See REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 15 ("Mistaken Belief in Existence of Contract 
with Payee") (1937); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.15. 
284. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note276, § 11.5. See generally 66 AM. JUR. 2DRestitution and 
Implied Contracts, §§ 118-44 ("Money Paid by Mistake") (1973 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Res· 
titution & Implied Contracts] (collecting cases in support of "firmly established general rule that 
money paid to another under the influence of a mistake of fact .•• may be recovered"). 
285. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (canvassing gamut of factual predicates). 
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paradigmatic restitution situations depicted in the preceding para-
graph. Equitable considerations are particularly relevant in determin-
ing whether it is unjust to allow the fund to retain the mistaken 
payments, because the language of BRISA frequently alludes to the 
lexicon of equity. BRISA's initial statement of policy proclaims that 
the purpose of the act is to improve "the equitable character and 
soundness of such [pension] plans."286 As one Senate committee ex-
plained, BRISA seeks "to provide the full range of legal and equitable 
remedies available in both state and federal courts .... "287 The stat-
ute also uses terminology that suggests restitutionary considerations 
should be the linchpin of the remedy urged by this Note. BRISA pro-
vides for the return of contributions made under mistakes of fact or 
law.288 "Mistake of fact" and "mistake of law" are legal terms of art 
traditionally thought of as restitutionary in nature.289 Given the equi-
table nature of BRISA pension plans, concerns about unjust enrich-
ment are particularly apposite.290 
The interest of the employer in return of the money should be 
weighed against the interest of the pension fund in its retention.291 
This calculus, made case-by-case, should comprehend all of the equi-
ties on both sides. The First Circuit's bellwether analysis in Kwatcher 
v. Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund292 alluded to the 
careful balancing required in such cases: 
286. BRISA § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(c) (1988). 
287. s. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4838, 4871. To that end, the statute authorizes the courts to grant "appropriate equitable 
relief." BRISA§ 502(a)(3){B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1988). 
288. See BRISA § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (c)(2)(A)(i-ii) (1988). 
289. See Teamsters Local 639 Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 
865, 867 (4th Cir. 1981) (mistake of fact section meant to incorporate traditional equity defini-
tion); see also R.EsrATEMENT OF REsrrruTioN § 44 (1937) (test for restitutionary entitlement 
identical for "mistake of law" and "mistake ••• offact"); 3 CoRBIN ON CoNTRAcrs §§ 616-617 
(1960); 13 S. WILLISrON, supra note 279, § 1574; cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 
U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (ERISA's use of word trust invokes common law and equitable fiduciary 
principles); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., 472 U.S. 559, 
570 (1985). 
290. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1990) 
("§ 1103(c)(2)(A) indicates a desire to ensure that plan funds are administered equitably and that 
no one party, not even plan beneficiaries, should unjustly profit"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 
(1990); Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Western Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund, 847 
F.2d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1988) ("It is axiomatic that ..• a party should not be allowed to profit 
from its own wrongs,'' especially since " 'Congress has emphasized the "equitable character'' ' " 
of pension plans.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989); Luby v. Teamsters Health & Welfare 
Fund, No. 89-5989, 1990 WL 181053 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1990) (1990 WL 181053) (federal com-
mon law of unjust enrichment appropriate for BRISA where plan paid benefits to wrong 
beneficiary). 
291. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. of Blee. Workers, 814 F.d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Teamsters Local 639 Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 868 (8th 
Cir. 1981); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Houston Pipe Line Co., 713 F. 
Supp. 1527, 1534-45 (N.D. m. 1989). 
292. 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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Because no two sets of circumstances are apt to be identical, we offer no 
catalog of the many other considerations which will be subject to equita-
ble weighing, save to say that they comprise essentially the type and kind 
to which chancery courts, historically, have looked in restitutionary ac-
tions. The trial court should consider whatever factors it may reason-
ably believe shed light on the fairness of reimbursement . . . [including] 
general equitable considerations and the guiding principles and purposes 
of BRISA. Equity, after all, is meant to be ftexible.293 
After all relevant interests have been considered, an employer should 
receive a refund of the mistaken contributions only when the equities 
weigh in its favor.294 
B. Translating ERISA Interests into Equitable Language 
Articulation of these general principles proves easier than their 
concrete application. Expressing the interests of employees and em-
ployers under BRISA in equitable terms often proves problematic.29s 
Section B attempts to convert into the parlance of equity the interests 
to be evaluated in an unjust enrichment action. Section B.1 translates 
the statutorily created interest in the pension fund's financial stability 
into equitable nomenclature, arguing that it deserves great weight. 
The relationship of the parties' ·contractual agreements to the quasi-
contract model of restitution is taken up in section B.2. Finally, sec-
tion B.3 explores the behavioral implications of allowing refunds. 
1. Pension Plan's Financial Stability 
The most important equitable consideration is the pension plan's 
interest in financial stability. Pension plans may develop reliance in-
terests that deserve extreme deference in light of ERISA's clear prefer-
ence for protecting pension assets. Obsession with the stability of the 
fund has driven some courts to adopt a per se refusal to refund over-
contributions.296 This section argues that such an overreaction ig-
nores the potentially beneficial effects of such refunds and gives short 
shrift to the inherent flexibility of the remedy this Note advances. The 
293. 879 F.2d 957, 967 (1st Cir. 1989); see also 2 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 11.6 (Where 
·~ust relief cannot be fitted" into a general restitution model, "it becomes necessary to mold the 
relief so as to do substantial justice in the case at hand."). 
294. Award Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension 
Trust Fund, 763 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986). 
295. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 668 F. Supp. 893, 901 
(D. Del. 1987) (struggling to find a "simple balancing of the equities,'' confounded because "the 
basis of the cause of action is ERISA,'' limited because "the court is not acting solely as a court 
in equity,'' and groping for a legal standard that can "include the policies of ERISA"), modified, 
850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). 
296. See, e.g .. Kann v. Keystone Resources, 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (all 
contributions irrevocable); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 
307, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (exclusive benefit rule absolute bar to restitution), ajfd. without 
opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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prudent course would allow a refund only when doing so poses no 
threat of :financial hardship to the pension plan. 
Protection of the :financial integrity of the pension plan is of para-
mount importance under ERISA.297 This concern is demonstrated by 
the imposition of strict :fiduciary duties, 298 vesting requirements, 299 re-
porting and disclosure rules,300 and withdrawal liability.301 Attempts 
by any person to reach fund assets are viewed suspiciously. As one 
court remarked early in ERISA's history, "[t]he actuarial soundness 
of pension funds is ... too important to permit trustees to obligate the 
fund to pay pensions to persons not entitled to them under the express 
terms of the pension plan."302 This objective might be compromised 
by the return of overcontributions. To the extent that return of the 
mistaken contributions would jeopardize the :financial stability of a 
pension plan, it cannot fairly be characterized as equitable. 
First, pension plans may change their position in expectation of 
retaining these assets. The contributions may have been put toward 
the payment of direct benefits, or used to reduce the obligations of 
defined-benefit employers. Second, refunds still may injure the fund 
even where the money has not been spent. Pension funds must make 
long range actuarial decisions that might be upset by unanticipated 
refunds. 303 Stability and predictability are essential to guarantee that 
those entitled to pension benefits receive them. 304 Finding substantial 
reliance interests present, one lower court explained that "[t]o impose 
a right to restitution in favor of employers could severely undermine 
the fund's integrity. Mistaken contributions, once invested, may be 
just as essential to the funds' integrity and stability as non-mistaken 
contributions .... "305 Neither the employer nor the fund may realize 
that the plan is not legally entitled to these contributions before con-
siderable reliance interests have attached. 
The concern about the :financial stability of pension funds finds an 
analog in the common law of restitution and is prudent, to an extent. 
297. See supra notes 226-33 and accompanying text. 
298. See BRISA §§ 401-14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (1988). 
299. See BRISA §§ 201-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1988). 
300. See BRISA §§ 101-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (1988). 
301. See BRISA §§ 4201-25, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1405 (1988). 
302. Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. Central States, S.B. & S.W. 
Areas Pension Fund v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, 511 F. Supp. 38, 47 (D. Minn. 1980) 
(damage actions by employers against trustees precluded since they would "deplete the Funds' 
assets and thus hinder the achievement of a primary goal of BRISA, protection of the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans"). 
303. Morales v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D. La. 1989), affd., 
914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990). 
304. Techmeier ex rel Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton, 797 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986). 
305. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 312 (E.D. Penn. 
1982), affd. without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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Defendants in unjust enrichment actions often counter that it would 
be inequitable to compel restitution since the recipient of the enrich-
ment has detrimentally relied on the mistaken payment. 306 Rather 
than barring refunds absolutely, however, reliance by the pension plan 
should be treated as one of the equities to be weighed when deciding 
whether to award restitution.307 Refunding mistaken payments does 
not necessarily result in an unambiguous loss for the pension plan. 
The refund may, in some situations, be ancillary to an overall reduc-
tion in the fund's liabilities. For example, suppose that an employer 
has contributed large sums in an employee's name to Plan A, under 
the mistaken assumption that the employee is enrolled in Plan A. The 
discovery that the employee is actually enrolled in Plan B, although it 
will cost Plan A the previous contributions, implies a concomitant re-
duction in liabilities for Plan A since it will no longer be required to 
pay that employee's benefits. 30s 
Other structural factors may mitigate the potential injury to the 
financial health of pension plans. The time limitations in the statute 
for refund minimize the risk oflong-term disruptions in financial plan-
ning, 309 because administrators should be aware that claims to the 
fund may be made until the limitations period has run.3 •0 Refunds 
can also be effectuated without an actual disgorgement of funds. 
When the employer has an ongoing obligation, credits for future pay-
ments can be issued, thus giving the plan time to adapt to the reduc-
tion in assets.311 
These observations suggest an approach superior to a categorical 
rejection of a remedy for employers. The court should determine 
306. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CoNTRAcrs § 9-30 (3d. ed. 1987); REsTATEMENT OP 
REsrmmoN § 69(1) (1937) (''The right of a person to restitution from another because of a 
benefit received because of mistake is terminated or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit, 
circumstances have so changed that it would be inequitable to require the other to make full 
restitution."). 
307. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OP REMEDIES§ 11.9 (1973). 
308. See Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Intl. Bhd. of Painters, 719 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir.), 
modified, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983). The court noted that 
[t]he trustees complain that a refund will diminish the plan's assets but neglect to mention 
the corresponding decrease in the fund's liabilities because the individuals for whom these 
contributions were made will not be entitled to pensions. Under the circumstances, the fund 
clearly would be unjustly enriched if it retained these monies. 
719 F.2d at 1066; see also Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce 
Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn. 1979) (noting that "although funds may be re-
duced, the number of beneficiaries would also be reduced as a result of ineligibility"), ajfd .. 611 
F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
309. Return of mistaken contributions to a single-employer pension plan may be had up to 
one year after payment; for multiemployer plans, a refund is allowed within six months of the 
administrator's determination of the overpayment. See supra note 12 for the full text of 
§ 403(c)(2)(A). 
310. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 
478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.), ajfd., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
311. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Borden, Inc., 736 F. 
Supp. 788, 793 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (issuing credit avoids financial surprise, uncertainty). 
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whether a refund will threaten the fund's financial soundness. The 
employer should be given an opportunity to adduce evidence that the 
plan is actuarially sound, and hence, not susceptible to financial ruin if 
the money is returned.312 The court should take into account the im-
pact a refund will have on the pension's stability and soundness,313 
and should grant the employer's request only if it does not injure the 
beneficiaries of the fund.314 Judicial creativity in fashioning remedies 
may make accomodation of the employer's refund request possible 
without injuring the fund. 
Before concluding that a pension's detrimental reliance on the 
overpayment precludes restitution, the court should also appraise the 
nature of the reliance. For instance, if the fund has already spent the 
money, the court might consider whether the expended funds pro-
cured any benefits for participants. If the money has merely been put 
toward ordinary expenses, then the pension plan should be required to 
return it to the employer.315 If, however, the fund has procured bene-
fits for participants, such as purchasing insurance for noncovered pen-
sioners, 316 then requiring a return would make the plan worse off than 
it was before the employer's mistake. In such a case, the equities 
would more strongly favor the pension plan.317 
312. Some courts require the trustees to prove a detrimental effect on the fund's fiscal integ-
rity. See Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. of Blee. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 529, 533 
(N.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 814 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1987). This would seem to be the appropriate 
allocation of burdens under the traditional restitution model because it is a defense to the unjust 
enrichment claim. The policy objectives served by BRISA, however, to the extent that they favor 
the fund's stability, might assign these burdens differently. This Note expresses no view as to 
which party should bear this burden. 
313. See Award Serv. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pen-
sion Trust Fund, 763 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A principal equitable consideration is 
whether restitution would undermine the financial stability of the plan."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
1081 (1986); see also Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 
967 (1st Cir. 1989). 
314. See Plucinski v. I.A.M. Natl. Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Chase v. Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744, 753 
(9th Cir. 1985) (only grant restitution if no effect on fund's stability); Dumac Forestry Serv. v. 
International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 529, 533 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (permitting refund 
after finding no risk of financial adversity), modified, 814 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1987). 
315. See D. DOBBS, supra note 307, § 11.5 (courts unsympathetic to recipients when money 
put toward expenses that would have been incurred anyway); Restitution & Implied Contracts, 
supra note 284, § 136 (satisfaction of existing debts or obligations with erroneous payment no 
defense). 
316. See Comment, supra note 234, at 74. 
317. See South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. C & G Mkts., 836 F.2d 
221, 225 (5th Cir.) (pension plan "entitled to full credit for benefits which were not required" but 
were disbursed to "employees for whom contributions were mistakenly received"), cert. denied, 
486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Teamsters Local 639 Employers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, 646 
F.2d 865, 867-68 (4th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that expenditure of mistaken payments on employee 
benefits might be a defense to a restitution suit); Florida W. Coast Operating Engrs. Local 925 
Welfare Fund v. Sunbelt Sales & Rentals, 732 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (equities 
favor fund, as against employer, where fund has furnished medical benefits to participants during 
dispute). 
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2. Statutory Limits and Express Party Agreement 
When the pension agreement fails to specify any recourse for em-
ployers who overcontribute, permitting employers to attempt to 
recoup these payments furthers BRISA's interests. This section of the 
Note offers two limitations, however, on refunds under section 403. 
First, BRISA's explicit strictures provide an outer boundary that equi-
table remedies may not breach. Second, assuming that a refund falls 
within the range permitted by BRISA, this section contends that it 
must also conform to any contractual stipulations of the parties; in 
such cases, the parties' mutually assented provisions should control. 
As the Sixth Circuit has argued, "any federal common law cause of 
action ... based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment would likewise 
be limited by the terms of the contract between the parties and federal 
law."318 
BRISA sets out parameters for the return of mistaken contribu-
tions that govern in the abs"ence of effective party choice. In the case 
of a multiemployer pension plan, the statute allows return of mistaken 
payments made "by a mistake of fact or law . . . within six months 
after the plan administrator determines that the contribution was 
made by such a mistake."319 In the case of a pension plan other than a 
multiemployer one, BRISA permits a refund for contributions made 
"by a mistake of fact . . . within one year after the payment of the 
contribution."320 Both the time limit provisions and the differentia-
tion of mistake based on fact or law must be strictly followed, because 
Congress obviously intended unique meanings for these terms by its 
election of different language in analogous, adjacent provisions. Statu-
tory requirements like these supply an outer limit on the relief avail-
able under common law.321 
The clearly expressed time limitations on refunds should not be 
malleable. Presumably, Congress imposed them to minimize the dis-
ruptions that stale refund claims can work upon the fund's reliance 
interests attaching to such contributions. 322 
The nature of the mistake also serves as a differentiating character-
318. Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 337 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 1986). 
319. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (c)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). It is significant that 
multiemployer plans may return contributions within six months after the error is discovered, 
which may in fact be much later than six months after the payment was made. For single em· 
ployer plans, the rule permits return only within one year of payment. 
320. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (c)(2)(A)(i) (1988). 
321. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989) (common law of 
estoppel due to oral modification of contract foreclosed because BRISA specifically requires writ· 
ten instruments to modify pension arrangements); Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 
(11th Cir. 1986) (same). But see Reuther v. Trustees of Trucking Employees, 575 F.2d 1074, 
1079 (3d Cir. 1978) (invoking equitable precepts to permit refunds of mistaken payments after 
expiration of one year statutory limitation period). 
322. See supra notes 303 -11 and accompanying text. 
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istic between single and multiemployer plans. Mistake of fact should 
be distinguished from mistake of law, since Congress contemplated 
that in some cases a mistake of law does not deserve recompense. The 
distinction between mistake of fact and law is relevant only when deal-
ing with a single employer pension plan; in the case of a multiem-
ployer plan, either type of mistake suffices. The legislative history 
tersely distinguished mistakes of fact and law for purposes of the stat-
ute. One House Conference Report cites as an example of mistake of 
fact "an arithmetical error in calculating the amounts that were con-
tributed to the plan."323 This limited example has been interpreted to 
imply few exceptions to the general rule. 324 In practice, mistake of 
fact generally encompasses only computation errors or erroneously 
held beliefs that an employee is enrolled in, as opposed to legally cov-
ered by, a pension plan. Mistakes about the obligations imposed, or 
the coverage afforded, by a particular pension agreement are consid-
ered mistakes of law.32s 
The second limitation on employer refunds derives directly from 
the parties' agreed terms. Quasi-contractual remedies such as restitu-
tion may not be used where there is an express agreement of the par-
ties that deals specifically with the contingency. 326 Although BRISA 
has specific provisions dealing with recapture of overpayments, the 
employer and the pension fund are free to modify them in the pension 
agreement. Because BRISA evinces considerable deference to the 
right of parties to agree to the terms of pension agreements, 327 the 
parties may agree to refund provisions substantially less generous than 
those contained in the statute. 328 The agreement may limit the time in 
323. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 303, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5083. 
324. See Audit Serv. v. Morning Star Enters., 881 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1989) (text in 
WESTLAW) (knowing contributions on behalf of ineligible employee not mistake of fact or law; 
no setofl); British Motor Car Distribs., Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Indus. Welfare Fund, 
882 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1989) (incorrect actuarial assumptions not a mistake of fact but rather an 
inherent uncertainty in pension agreements; employer not entitled to recover). 
325. See Philippines, Micronesia & Orient Navigation Co. v. NYSA-ILA Pension Trust 
Fund, 909 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir.) (mistake of fact does not encompass disagreement over defini-
tions of pension agreement terms), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 515 (1990); Crews v. Central States, 
S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1986) (misconstruction of terms is 
mistake of law, not fact); Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 1979) (reliance on incor-
rect advice concerning propriety of contributions is "a mistake concerning the coverage of the 
agreement which is a mistake of law."); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. 
Wholesale Produce Supply Co., 478 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Minn.) (coverage of plan is mistake of 
law), ajfd., 611 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
326. See infra notes 332-36 and accompanying text. 
327. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504, 511 (1981) (terms of pension agree-
ments left to parties); Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 1982) ("de-
spite the extensive statutory scheme governing pension plans, Congress left many matters to the 
discretion of the parties"). 
328. See Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 567 n.14 (S.D. Miss. 
1987) ("Although BRISA allows for recovery under mistake of fact or mistake oflaw, the parties 
to the agreement are free to modify the circumstances under which a refund may be sought"). 
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which refunds may occur,329 or it might restrict return to only certain 
categories of mistake. 330 An outright prohibition on refunds of any 
kind could also be negotiated.331 
If both parties agree to restrictive refund policies, it is hard to 
make a claim that one was unjustly enriched at the other's expense.332 
The Seventh Circuit once observed that "[e]nrichment is not 'unjust' 
where it is allowed by the express terms of the pension plan."333 In 
the same spirit, the Third Circuit has commented that it is "particu-
larly reluctant to fashion a federal common law doctrine of unjust en-
richment when such a right would override a contractual provision," 
since "the presence of an agreement that has not been rescinded pre-
cludes application of the quasi-contractual remedy."334 Although fed-
eral courts have broad equitable powers under BRISA, they should 
not use them to override express contractual provisions.335 Quasi-con-
tractual remedies seek to prevent uncontemplated situations from 
working injustice. When the parties have in fact provided for such 
contingencies in the agreement, the law of quasi-contract has no 
place.336 
329. See. e.g., Admiral Packing Co. v. Robert F. Kennedy Farm Workers Medical Plan, 874 
F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1989); Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 637 F. 
Supp. 529 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 814 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1987); Fuller Cinder Co. v. Central 
States Pension Fund, 2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2458 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
330. See. e.g., Crews v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332 (6th 
Cir. 1986) (upholding agreement limiting refunds to mistake of fact only); Electricians Health, 
Welfare, & Pension Plans v. Gulino, 594 F. Supp. 1265, 1272-73 (M.D. La. 1984) (same). 
331. See. e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 668 F. Supp. 893 (D. 
Del. 1987) (adoption of "no refund" policy absolute bar to § 1103 recovery) modified, 850 F.2d 
1028 (3d Cir. 1988); Trustees of Central Cal. Prod. Workers' Trust Fund v. Acosta, 6 Employee 
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2697 (N.D. Calif. 1985) (same). 
332. Cf. REsrATEMBNT OF REsrmmoN § 107 comment 1 (1937) ("[A] person is not enti-
tled to compensation on the ground of unjust enrichment ifhe received from the other that which 
it was agreed ••• the other should give in return."). 
333. Techmeier ex rel Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390 
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986). The court was "particularly reluctant to 
fashion a federal common law doctrine of unjust enrichment when such a right would override a 
contractual provision in a pension plan." 797 F.2d at 390. 
334. Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 1982). 
335. See Admiral Packing Co. v. Robert F. Kennedy Farm Workers Medical Plan, 874 F.2d 
683, 686 (9th Cir. 1989) (forbidding district court from "set[ting] aside rules affecting pension 
benefits where they are fixed by .the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and violate no 
command of Congress"); Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(despite ERISA's "ennobling purposes," courts should not "torture language in an attempt to 
force particular results ••• the contracting parties neither intended nor imagined"); Morales v. 
Pan American Life Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D. La. 1989) (quasi-contractual dam-
ages forbidden; parties limited to only those termination benefits specified in written agreement), 
ajfd., 914 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1990); Searcy v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 728 
Pension Trust Fund, 685 F. Supp. 241, 242 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (equitable latitude under BRISA 
constrained by express contractual provisions). 
336. Even where the pension plan permits refunds pursuant only to an agreed procedure, 
employers are not totally without a remedy. The decision to deny a refund under the terms of 
the parties' agreement is reviewable under a deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See 
Dumac Forestry Serv. v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 814 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1987); 
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3. Systemic ERJSA Interests 
Traditionally, restitution was granted to one who mistakenly en-
riched another without reference to the benefactor's fault. 337 The Re-
statement of Restitution specifically forecloses the negligence of the 
transferor as a defense to an unjust enrichment action: "A person who 
has conferred a benefit upon another by mistake is not precluded by 
the fact that the mistake was due to his lack of care."338 Similarly, the 
mistake need not be mutual; the mistake of the payor was sufficient 
grounds to make a claim for restitution, even where the recipient had 
made no error.339 Finally, the traditional unjust enrichment action 
did not consider the size or importance of the mistake; the plaintiff did 
not need to show that the mistake was significant to be entitled to 
recovery. 340 
These traditional principles should be modified when applied to 
the BRISA setting. Mistakes do not occur in a sphere of completely 
private interest. The relationship is a statutorily created and regulated 
one, and therefore involves considerations of public policy. Further-
more, an ongoing relationship exists where similar situations may arise 
again. Thus, the equities to be taken into account should also capture 
the systemic interests served by the statute as well as notions of indi-
vidual fairness.341 Before deciding to return the money, courts should 
consider the type of the mistake, its causes, its avoidability, and the 
disincentives created by a refund. 
Considerable expense, uncertainty, and acrimony attend overpay-
ment disputes. 342 BRISA expresses an interest not only in reducing 
such wasteful expenditures by pension funds, but also in securing har-
monious relations between employer and pension plan. 343 One equita-
ble consideration that should be evaluated is the effect a refund will 
have on the incentive of the employer to make such mistakes again in 
Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 
236 n. 24 (6th Cir.). cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Intl. 
Bhd. of Painters, 719 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir.), modified, 724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983). 
337. See D. DOBBS, supra note 307, § 11.7. 
338. REsTATEMENT OF REsrrruTION § 59 (1937). 
339. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 306, § 9-29; D. DOBBS, supra note 307, 
§ 11.7 (1973); 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.24. 
340. See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 276, § 14.24. But see Restitution & Implied Contracts, 
supra note 284, § 131 (suggesting that "negligence may be relevant in determining whether it is 
equitable to allow a recovery"). 
341. See Soft Drink Indus. Local Union No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
679 F. Supp. 743, 751 (N.D. ID. 1988) ("Equity provides the proper mediation between the 
principles embodied in the refund section and the overall command to which it is an excep-
tion."); see also Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 967 
(1st Cir. 1989) (court should weigh all factors "against the backdrop of general equitable consid-
erations and the guiding principles and purposes of BRISA"). 
342. See supra notes 226-52 and accompanying text. 
343. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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the future. As the Sixth Circuit commented, it is not unreasonable to 
demand punctiliousness on the part of employers because "Congress, 
in weighing the interests implicated in the context of employee benefit 
plans, has favored the financial soundness of the plan and held em-
ployers to high standards of accounting."344 Before permitting a re-
fund, the court should consider whether the employer could have 
easily avoided the mistake with the exercise of minimal care. 345 The 
court may inquire whether the employer was in sole control of the 
needed information, or was in the best position to determine if a mis-
take was being made. 346 If the adoption of even rudimentary book-
keeping procedures would mitigate such risks in the future, then 
perhaps letting the employer bear the full extent of the loss will have a 
positive incentive effect. On the other hand, equity would more 
strongly favor the employer if the mistake were the fault of the trust-
ees, as in the case where the trustees supply the employer with invalid 
contribution data. 347 In sum, equity has a justifiable interest in trying 
to reduce the incidence of disputes over mistaken payments. 
CONCLUSION 
BRISA optimizes retiree welfare by engrafting onto private pen-
sion plans regulations with minimal disincentives to plan maintenance 
and growth. In a purely voluntary system, zealous protection of pres-
ently accrued benefits would be a Pyrrhic victory if purchased at the 
cost of inhibitions on the scope and quality of pension coverage of-
fered. Irretrievable payments made in error to pension funds detract 
from the utility employers derive from creating pension arrangements 
and therefore discourage employer participation. BRISA gives courts 
flexibility to address this disincentive through the mistaken contribu-
tion provision. This Note proposes a common law remedy that per-
mits equitable return of erroneous contributions. The restitutionary 
model advanced by this Note, capturing traditional equitable precepts 
and statutory objectives, permits return of the money only when reten-
tion of the overpayment would be unjust. 
Courts should interpret section 403 to permit employers to recover 
344. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 
F.2d 221, 236 n.24 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1986); see also Kann v. Keystone 
Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (employer should bear full risk of 
mistake). 
345. See Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 560, 569 (S.D. Miss. 1987) 
(no refund if mistake due to "haphazard management" by employer). 
346. See Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 963 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (employer in best position to monitor own eligibility); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. 
Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same), ajfd. without opinion, 
720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); cf. Connors v. Beth Energy Mines, 920 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(trustees deprived of equitable tolling defense where they were in best position to realize em-
ployer's accounting method erroneous). 
347. See Comment, supra note 234, at 75. 
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mistakenly paid contributions for two pragmatic reasons. Employers 
who must absorb the deadweight loss associated with mistaken pay-
ments either reduce the pension coverage offered, or attempt to offset 
the error by withholding subsequent payments owing to the fund. 
Both possibilities are inferior to a legal remedy that remits overpay-
ments. Rational judicial supervision of the refund process is impera-
tive. A system that relies so heavily on the private sector for its 
success cannot long survive if it turns a blind eye to the realities of the 
cost-benefit calculus employers face in deciding when to provide pen-
sion benefits, if at all. 
- J. Daniel Plants 
